

EBUR



This report arises from a growing awareness of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of Western involvement in Africa. It is incomplete in that it concerns itself mainly with ivory. However it is presented as a first step to wider and more detailed discussion.

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I. S. C. Parker
P. O. Box 30678
Nairobi, Kenya

Ten Copies of this report were made.

This is No. 10. given to *R.M. Laws. and later*
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INTRODUCTION

Ivory, like gold, shapes the destinies of men. Across cultures and through history its possession has been a criterion of wealth. The invaders of Africa, the world's main source of Ivory, have always sought it as prime booty and Arab slaving was closely connected with its acquisition. In many instances slaves were primarily acquired to carry tusks to the sea, their subsequent sale increasing the profits of Ivory trading. The first white men also sought the 'white gold', and among the first acts of colonial government was laying claim to the ivory of the land. As much as any single factor the commodity played a role in delineating modern Africa's political boundaries.

Ivory's lure endures, and more leaves Africa today than at any time in the past. The revenues involved are substantial and the conduct of the trade reveals much about African leaders. Circumstantial evidence suggests their widespread illegal involvement in it, the implications of which are of great political interest. In this report it is my intention to set forth some definite facts, hitherto unpublished, which confirm and illustrate the extent of the illegal trade. Unfortunately much of the information cannot be published without arousing destructive political reactions and this report is therefore confidential.

Because the evidence is largely comprised of dry statistics, a document such as this makes laborious reading. I have endeavoured to ensure continuity and an easy flow by abandoning scientific procedures of documenting each statement with copious references. Similarly, I have

dispensed with a bibliography and relegated the tables of data to the back of the report.

The focus of attention is on what is happening today and what it portends for the future. I have thus endeavoured to put this in an historical perspective of the East African ivory trade over the past 74 years. The first two chapters are therefore descriptive and provide a general background to the modern situation. The report is not intended as a base for legal actions. I have therefore collated evidence of illegality only to the point of my personal conviction. To have proceeded further so that it would stand up in a court of law, would have unnecessarily revealed my interests to hostile scrutiny.

For obvious reasons I do not reveal informants' names, though these can be followed up in cases of bona fide interest. Similarly, individual acknowledgments for assistance in producing this report would be out of place. However, it is by no means a lone effort and I am indebted to those who have financed it and to many collaborators for their trust and help.

CHAPTER 1

THE OFFICIAL EAST AFRICAN IVORY TRADE1. KENYA

For hundreds of years elephant tusks were exported from the Kenya coast, but in 1900 the British enacted a law banning free trade in ivory. It was largely ineffective, and the country's Chief Game Warden stated in his 1910 annual report :

"...little notice was taken of the law, except that it gave birth to the ivory smuggling trade."

To the present time the laws governing ivory trading have proved difficult to enforce. The underlying philosophy of Government policy through this century is summed in a proclamation issued on the 31st May 1912 which decreed that :

"No ivory could be legally possessed except

- (1) under the Game Laws, and
- (2) purchased from Government for export."

Tusks could not be sold without a Sale Permit. Trading in ivory was barred except to those in possession of a Dealer's Permit. Until the Second World War many large mercantile trading companies had Dealer's Permits. After the war their interest declined and ivory dealing was left in the hands of Indian traders, who throughout the century had formed the backbone of the trade. This dominance started declining in 1970 with the entry of African businessmen into the trade. However, though this process continues and the African position has become stronger, it is difficult to define Indian involvement as they have entered cryptic partnerships with the newcomers.

The main sources of ivory within Kenya have been :

- (1) the legal killing of elephant in protection of human life and property,
- (2) the finding of ivory on elephant that died of natural causes,
- (3) the confiscation of illicit ivory and
- (4) tusks obtained by sportsmen on licence.

The first three categories produced by far the greater volume of ivory exported.

Responsibility for Government sales lay with the Customs and Excise authorities from 1900 until 1956, when it was taken over by the Game Department. This change was made to co-ordinate the trade under one body and thereby reduce illicit dealing. Disposal of Government ivory was by regular auctions held in Mombasa. The main buyers at these auctions were the country's licensed dealers, the majority of whom were based in Mombasa. From about 1970 the Game Department began selling Government ivory by direct negotiation with individual dealers - an unpublicised process that has grown at the expense of the traditional auctions since then. From September 1973 until April 1974, the Government banned all trade in ivory and the hunting of elephant. The ban was re-introduced in July 1974 when it was announced that all trade in tusks was to be a permanent Government monopoly.

In theory, natural mortality should constitute a major source of ivory. Rural Africans coming across dead elephants are unlikely to forego the opportunity of benefiting from tusks thus available. However, such ivory has always been difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from that taken

from elephant killed illegally. As a result there has been an unresolved and continuous conflict between Government's pecuniary interest in recovering ivory from natural mortality and the provision of cover for illicit hunting that arises from such collection.

In 1902 Indian traders persuaded the Government that the natives held large quantities of "female and old tusks". The Chief of Customs therefore authorised Government officers to purchase such ivory from the natives at 50% of the prevailing market value of Ivory until June 1903 (this ivory was then presumably sold by auction to the traders who had set the process in motion!) In June 1903, this Government buying was continued erratically until at least June 1911. There is a gap in the Game Department literature between 1913 and 1924, but when taken up again, debate on whether or not to encourage the collection of ivory from natural mortality still raged. In 1925 the Game Department's attitude was summed thus :

"The Police could scarcely expect to suppress theft
if they acted as receivers of stolen property."

Nevertheless, from 1925 until the present day a reward system has been in force, with rewards of the order of 10% of prevailing market values. In consequence illicit buying has been encouraged as a trader could buy found ivory on the black market for 20% of its value and sell it at market price, making 500% profit.

In or shortly after 1970, the Game Department changed its traditional antagonism toward rewarding the collection of ivory from natural mortality (though this was never proclaimed publicly). "Collector's" permits were issued for the first time, which authorised selected persons to gather such

ivory. The tusks so collected were supposed to be handed in to the Department in return for an unspecified "reward".

The potential of natural mortality as a source of ivory was persistently overlooked by the Game Department through gross under-estimates of elephant numbers. Until the early 1950s it was widely felt that they did not exceed 12, 000. Research in the late 1960s indicated that in 1969 there were probably about 165, 000 elephants. This, after years of attrition and displacement by expanding human populations, suggests that numbers were probably far greater in the early years of the century.

Since 1900 the official records and the Press have stated that poaching was extensive and jeopardised the survival of wild life populations. In particular, illegal ivory hunting was said to be widespread. However, there are few official data to support this. The early reports for the years 1906 to 1913 published the amounts of ivory confiscated annually, giving a measure of illicit activity. Subsequent annual reports beginning in 1925 gave early convictions for offences against the Game Laws, but not those specifically concerning ivory. These annual convictions show a trend that reached its highest point in the 1930s and then declined progressively until 1965, when the Game Department ceased publishing reports on its activities.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Indian ivory dealers have always bought illegally in addition to their legitimate trade though this has not been corroborated by court convictions - the normal measure of unlawful activity. Through the 1970s there has been increasing public protest about the level of poaching despite lack of evidence. This seems

to have led to the closure of elephant hunting and ivory trading, temporarily in 1973, and permanently in 1974.

Evidence will be presented later in this report to substantiate the extent of the illicit trade. However, this trade was from the beginning encouraged by the failure of the Game Laws to offer adequate rewards for the large volume of ivory annually available from natural mortality.

In addition to ivory produced in Kenya (which I shall refer to as domestic), the country's licensed dealers traded extensively in tusks from other African states. As a result Mombasa became an entrepot for the continental ivory trade. This import and re-export of alien ivory was banned in 1962. The unconvincing reason given was that by denying hunters outside East Africa a market for their tusks, the incentive to kill elephants would be reduced.

The volume of Kenya's ivory trade, both domestically produced and the import/export quantities, is presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. The data are derived from Customs records, with the exception of the years 1910 - 1913 which are from incomplete Game Department reports. They indicate progressive increase in Kenya's output through the century. This is not unexpected as elephants have been continuously replaced by humans. However, the most striking aspect of production over the past seven decades is seen in the years 1971 - 1973. In these annual increase in the volume of domestic ivory exported, expressed as a percentage of each preceding year's volume, was respectively 86.4%, 81.6% and 78.6%. Thus 1973 exports were 260% higher than the average annual exports of




FIG. 1 Kenya's official Domestic and Re-exported ivory exports 1906 - 1973.

domestic ivory for the decade 1960 - 1969, and are too large to be accounted for by Kenya's population increases. It is worth noting that these steep rises in exports coincided with the entry of Africans into the ivory trade, the issuing of "Collector's" Permits or letters by the Game Department and the commencement of air-freighting ivory from Nairobi, rather than by the traditional sea routes from Mombasa. These points have bearing on later discussion in this report.

2. UGANDA

At least as far back as the mid-1800s, ivory was moving down the Nile from Bunyoro to Khartoum. Baker records Arab traders obtaining tusks from the Banyoro in large quantity. At the same time the Baganda were trading ivory with Arabs from Zanzibar. When the Imperial British East Africa Company established an administration in Buganda and Toro, it laid claim to all ivory. This monopoly was maintained by the British Government when it assumed direct responsibility for the country's government in 1893. Until 1905, ivory was Uganda's foremost commercial export.

As Uganda has denser human populations than the other East African states, competition for space between men and elephants has been more intense. From the outset of Colonial government this was a fundamental problem. In 1912 natives were issued with rifles to shoot crop-raiding elephants. This was insufficient. In 1918 District Commissioners were empowered to hire European gunmen to kill elephants, payment being made as a percentage of the ivory handed in. This system was closely followed by licensing which permitted a sportsman to kill 20 elephants per licence.

These efforts still did little to resolve human–elephant conflict.

In 1923, C. F. M. Swynnerton of the Tanganyika Government service was sent to advise the Uganda Government on their elephant problem. As a result of his recommendations a new Department was formed to handle elephant control. In 1925 this became the Uganda Game Department. In principle this new body was modelled on the neighbouring Kenya Game Department and accepted as its prime role the conservation of wild animals. In fact its main pre-occupation has always been "elephant control" and consequently the Department has been a major ivory producer. A result of the Department's work is that the range of elephants has declined from more than 70% of the country's land area in 1929, to less than 11% in 1969. Today it is undoubtedly smaller still.

Official policy toward ivory production in Uganda exhibited the same inability to come to terms with natural mortality that was shown in Kenya. Although poaching was never considered to be the same threat to wild life in Uganda as it has been in Kenya, it is probable that an illegal trade in ivory existed. In 1968 the Government declared an amnesty to those possessing illegal ivory and at the same time offered a reward for tusks handed in. In six months, 81 tons were surrendered. It is difficult to explain so large a quantity of tusks through random hoarding, and more likely that an illicit trade was tapped.

Uganda, lacking a sea port, never developed an entrepot trade in the same manner as Kenya. The Kenya Customs authorities sold Uganda ivory by auction in Mombasa on behalf of the Government until 1967, when the

Game Department decided to hold ivory auctions in Kampala. Though much ivory from Zaire passed through Uganda in transit to Mombasa and Zanzibar, no import/export trade of significance developed in the country throughout the colonial era. However, during the 1960s and early 1970s it was widely rumoured that Uganda received a lot of ivory from both Zaire and Sudan. As in Kenya, private ivory buyers in Uganda were mainly Indians, usually agents of the Mombasa dealers. In 1971 they were expelled from the country and the trade was then entirely in African hands. Since the introduction of air-freighting, most of Uganda's ivory exports have been flown out of Entebbe and have not been exported through Kenya.

Uganda's domestic ivory exports are given in Table 2 and Figure 2 for the period 1925 - 1973. As with Kenya, these data derive from the Customs records. The Game Department archives do not contain such information. The data indicate more or less increasing production until 1969, after which there is a steep fall. In view of the decline in elephant range from 70%+ to 11%- of the land area between 1929 and 1969, it is surprising that ivory production went on increasing until so late as 1969 in the process of elephant elimination. It suggests that the Customs data may be incomplete.

3. TANZANIA

As the two components of Tanzania - Tanganyika and Zanzibar - have had different roles in the region's ivory trade, I consider them separately.

Tanganyika

I do not have access to detailed records from Tanganyika prior to 1925, though the country has been known for centuries as a major ivory source. Under British rule Game Laws were modelled on the neighbouring Kenya




FIG. 2 Uganda's Domestic ivory exports 1929 - 1973.

system with the difference that native Tanganyikans were more readily allowed to hunt elephants. As in Kenya, the main traders in ivory were Indians. A minor import/export business in tusks from other African states developed but this was far less consistent than those which flourished in Mombasa and Zanzibar. This business was officially terminated in 1962 for the same reasons (whatever they may have been) that it was abandoned in Kenya. However, the ban was not so absolute as elsewhere in East Africa and small quantities of ivory have come into the country from Zambia from time to time.

The increasingly socialistic policy pursued by Tanganyika since independence has discriminated against alien businessmen. As a result the Indians dealing in ivory have been forced out of the trade (and other businesses). In 1970, the Government declared a state monopoly on ivory trading which persists to the present. As a result of publicity on poaching the Government banned elephant hunting in September 1973. This ban has not been lifted, though there are said to be plans to do so. As with Kenya, the level of illicit hunting in Tanganyika has never been established, though again circumstantial evidence has suggested that it is widespread.

Tanganyika's domestic and import/export ivory volumes are presented in Table 3 and Figure 3. Once more they derive from the Customs authorities rather than the more (in theory) appropriate Game Department, which is without continuous records. The data indicate a gradual but accelerating increase in domestic ivory exports throughout the period reviewed until 1973. In that year there is an abrupt decline and exports were only 26% of the preceding year's figures. No official reason has been




FIG. 3 Tanganyika's official Domestic and Re-exported ivory exports 1929 - 1973.

proffered for this decline. Due to its greater size, Tanganyika has been by far the largest ivory producer of the three East African states.

Zanzibar

As far as is known, Zanzibar has never had indigenous elephants, although the island's terrestrial fauna indicate that at one time it must have been connected with the African mainland. However, its role as an entrepot for ivory has been known for centuries. Its geographical position has favoured such a development and until 1963 it was one of the world's great ivory markets. Tusks were bought the length of Africa, taken to Zanzibar, re-graded, sometimes cut and polished, then sold to overseas outlets. The 1964 revolution virtually terminated the trade in Zanzibar. The Indians and Arabs who managed it fled or died.

Annual recorded imports and exports of ivory into and from Zanzibar from 1925 to 1963 are presented in Table 4 and Figure 4. These data are from Customs records. They indicate a steady rise in import volume from 26 tons in 1925 to 228 tons in 1962 - a growth of over 750%. Over the 49 years reviewed, Zanzibar's main supplier was Zaire (31%), followed by Tanganyika (24%), Mozambique (18%), Uganda (8%), Kenya (7%) and both Somalia and Zambia (5%). Many other countries produced smaller amounts.

4. EAST AFRICAN EXPORTS COMBINED

The total ivory exports from the East African states for the years 1929 - 1973 are given in Table 5 and Figure 5. Output rose from around 100 tons annually in the early 1930s to just under 400 tons in 1961. The




FIG. 4 Zanzibar's official ivory exports 1925 - 1973




FIG. 5 Combined East African exports of ivory
1929 - 1973.

ban on importing ivory in 1962 and the Zanzibar revolution caused exports to fall to c.162 tons from 1962 to 1965. In 1966 they rose to over 200 tons and fluctuated between 200 and 260 tons annually until 1972, when there was a sharp increase to 433 tons, followed by 358 tons in 1973.

At first glance it would appear that the 1972 - 1973 exports merely regained the ground lost in 1962. However, of the 1961 exports of 393 tons, no less than 177 tons (45%) originated outside East Africa. Officially, there have been no significant imports into East Africa since 1962, and therefore the 1972 - 1973 exports were comprised of domestic ivory only. If this is true increase in production has been greater than at any time in the past 45 years. While I personally have no doubt that there has been an increase in elephants killed annually in East Africa, the three East African Game Departments are unable to substantiate this factually. It is possible that it is not as great as suggested from the ivory record. I suspect that the Customs & Excise import records are incomplete and do not show some recent imports of ivory.

In Table 6 the combined domestic exports of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika ivory are given with countries of destination, for the years 1962 - 1973. This period should, at least officially, reflect domestic ivory production unadulterated by imports from elsewhere in Africa, or complicated by the former Zanzibar entrepot trade. The data illustrate the wide range of countries buying raw ivory and at the same time show that few buy in quantity. Continentally, Asia has taken 82% of exported ivory, Europe 12%, the Americas 5% with the balance taken by Australasian and Oceanic states. Of individual countries buying ivory, East Africa's

largest customer is Hong Kong (47%) followed by Japan (17%) and India as an erratic third (9%). Recently China has entered the market and although it is too new as an East African buyer to figure prominently over the period 1962 - 1973, it gives the appearance of moving in toward a major position.

CHAPTER 2
THE HONG KONG TRADE

The previous chapter gave a picture of the ivory trade from a producer's view. I now intend to broaden this by presenting data from a buying and processing centre - Hong Kong. My information was supplied by the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government.

In its unworked raw form, ivory is measured and valued by weight. Once it has been fashioned into some article, value is based on artistic quality and the labour involved in producing it (though the weight of the raw piece from which an article is made provides a starting point for valuation). It is thus difficult to relate Hong Kong's imports of raw ivory to its exports of carved items on a weight basis. Initially, therefore, I shall consider raw and worked ivory separately.

Hong Kong's raw ivory imports, average annual values per kilo, and total value in US dollars are given in Table 7 and Figure 6 for the years 1952 to 1973. They indicate trends of rising volume and value. The greatest single increases occurred in 1973 when volume rose 111% over the average annual imports of the preceding 5 years, and value rose 153% over 1972's average - itself the highest between 1952 and 1972. As a result of this increase, 39% of the 22 year value of raw ivory imports (\$46,925,814) was attributable to 1973 alone.

The Hong Kong records do not specify all countries from which raw ivory imports originated until 1959. In Table 8, some of the data in




FIG. 6 Hong Kong's Imports of raw ivory
1952 - 1973.

Table 7 are broken down further to give countries of origin and amounts for the years 1959 - 1973. On a continental basis, Africa supplied 82% of imports, Europe 15% and Asia 3%. A total of 36 countries are recorded as having supplied raw ivory to Hong Kong. The two major suppliers are Tanzania (31%) and Kenya (23%), followed by Belgium (12%), Mozambique (9%), Uganda (5%) and Zaire (4%). The remaining 30 sources of import produced correspondingly small amounts. Belgium's large contribution of raw ivory reflects its dominant position as a buyer in Francophone Africa - particularly in Zaire. The ivory received from Persian Gulf states is most probably obtained through the dhow trade along the sea boards of Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania. I will make further consideration of this in Chapter 3.

Trends indicated in Table 8 are :

- 1) The number of countries supplying Hong Kong with ivory nearly trebled between 1959 and 1973.
- 2) Tanzania's contribution rose from 38% in 1959 to 44% in 1964, then fell to 22% in 1972 and 5% in 1973. Until 1973 Tanzania's overall exports were rising (Table 3), and the Hong Kong data merely indicate a change in outlets (Tanzania's new buyers were Japan and China).
- 3) Kenya's contribution rose from 11% in 1959 to 37% in 1973. Thus while Tanzania was the largest supplier of ivory to Hong Kong over the whole of the 15 years covered, Kenya had usurped this role in the latter half of the period.

Hong Kong re-exports some raw ivory and this is illustrated in Table 9 for the period 1962 - 1971 (data for 1972 and 1973 had not been received at the time of writing). In these 10 years raw ivory was exported to 14 countries. China was the major buyer (76%), followed by Japan (20%) and North Vietnam (2%). All other countries took less than 1% of the volume of re-exported raw ivory. The period is too short to reveal definite trends, but it appears that China's purchases were declining while Japan's were increasing from 1969 onward.

In Table 10 the weights and values of Hong Kong's raw ivory imports are compared with those of re-exports for the years 1962 - 1971. The data indicate that annual re-exports varied between 12% and 31% of corresponding annual imports of raw ivory, averaging 19% over the 10 years. Re-exports were on average 24% higher in value per unit weight than raw ivory imports (variation +3% to +52%). Some increase is to be expected as any ivory moving through Hong Kong would accumulate storage, handling and trading costs. On a crude level however, the 24% increase in value is an indicator of profitability in trading raw ivory.

Hong Kong's worked ivory export values for the years 1962 - 1971, together with the values of raw ivory imported and retained in Hong Kong (i.e. annual raw ivory imported less raw ivory re-exported) are given in Table 11. These data indicate that worked ivory export values were 58% greater than import values.

In addition to its own ivory manufacturing industry, Hong Kong imports worked ivory from other countries. Some of this is then re-exported.

Data on the import and re-export of worked ivory are given in Table 12 for the period 1962 - 1973. In this case only 27% in value is re-exported, suggesting that most of the worked ivory imports are 'for consumption' in Hong Kong, illustrating that the colony is more than just an entrepot.

The countries from which Hong Kong imports worked ivory are listed in Table 13, together with annual values, for the years 1962 - 1973. From these data it is apparent that China is the main supplier (96%). Chinese exports of worked ivory rose significantly (\$228,461 in 1962, \$1,605,944 in 1973) at the same time as its imports of raw ivory from Hong Kong were declining. This suggests that it was getting its requirements from elsewhere and is borne out by the data from the East African records (Table 6).

Hong Kong exports worked ivory to more than 117 countries, which are listed in Table 14. However, of these few have imported more than 2% of the value of worked ivory exports in any one year of the 12 years reviewed, and fewer still have taken more than 5%. (These are indicated in the Table.) The pattern of exports is small quantities to many outlets, with only 3 exceptions; the U.S.A. 35% of Hong Kong exports, and France 24% over the whole 12 years, and Japan rising steadily over the past 5 years to 28% in 1973.

The difficulty of equating raw ivory volume with worked ivory value notwithstanding, it is possible on the basis of the foregoing information to draw up a "balance sheet" for the Hong Kong ivory trade. This is done in Table 15, where the values of raw and worked ivory imports are subtracted from the values of exports and re-exports. The "profit" shown thereby is

minimal as internal sales are not registered, and the data derive from Customs declarations which tend, as a rule, to be understatements of value. These minimal values notwithstanding, the legitimate ivory trade in Hong Kong is obviously most profitable.

Unlike East Africa the ivory business in Hong Kong is open and unrepressed. It is the base for many companies, and an even greater number of private individuals. Nevertheless, while there is no ground for an extensive illegal trade as in East Africa, an element of illegality exists when Hong Kong dealers receive ivory in the guise of some other commodity. Many, if not most, of the major East African Indian dealers have companies in Hong Kong which would simplify the reception of illicit consignments shipped from Africa.

CHAPTER 3

COMPARISONS OF EAST AFRICAN IVORY EXPORT STATISTICS
WITH IMPORT RECORDS FROM HONG KONG AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM

Hong Kong and the United Kingdom together accounted for c.50% of official East African ivory exports between 1959 and 1973. Their import statistics provide a large sample with which to check the accuracy of the East African figures.

Prior to the advent of air-freighting ivory in the 1970s, there was an unavoidable delay of several weeks between shipping and landing consignments. Time on the high seas could easily have resulted in some of a year's exports not arriving at their destinations until the following calendar year. Thus prior to 1970 this lag will complicate comparison of exports and imports, which in theory should balance each other. Conceivably a year's exports matched with its successor's imports might produce a more correct comparison in some instances. In seeking to get export/import data to tally I shall therefore make such 'skewed' comparisons as well as considering exports and imports of the same year.

The exporters' and importers' Customs records give both volume and value of ivory consignments. The former give a base for straightforward comparison; values, however, are more difficult. By international convention export values are declared by the commodity's consignor as at the time of delivery on board ship or aircraft. This is referred to as the f.o.b. (free on board) value. Import values are based on the f.o.b. value plus the cost of transport, handling and insurance up to the point

of landing. This landed value is known as the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) value. As all trade goods are accompanied by shipping documents stating their f.o.b. value, these form the basis for calculating c.i.f. values. As a generalisation, the c.i.f. value of ivory entering Hong Kong or the U.K. from East Africa should be well within the limit of f.o.b. plus 20% and have been relatively constant from one year to the next. At no time should a c.i.f. value be less than a f.o.b. value. Such an occurrence or widely differing f.o.b. - c.i.f. values are grounds to suspect changes in the volumes (and therefore values) of a consignment, either upward or downward, in transit. Unfortunately the time lag between shipping and landing blunts fine distinctions in comparisons of ivory's export and import values per unit weight. I shall present f.o.b. and c.i.f. values of annual export/import in the following sections, but their use is limited and results should only be considered of consequence where they are supported by the comparisons of volume.

1. KENYA - HONG KONG

Kenya's stated ivory exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's imports from Kenya for the 15 years 1959 - 1973 are given in Table 15. The data show wide discrepancies. Kenya claims to have exported 403 tons, while Hong Kong imported 874 tons. In 14 of the 15 years, the Hong Kong imports were greater than stated Kenya exports by margins ranging from 5% to 678% (of export volumes given). In the only year exports exceeded imports it was by 1%. Skewing comparisons so that exports for one year are related to imports of the following year - either singly or in groups - gives no better agreement than comparisons within the same year. Overall Hong Kong's imports from Kenya were 117% greater than Kenya's claimed exports to

Hong Kong. These irregularities are given particular emphasis when the Kenya Government declared a ban on ivory trading from 6th September 1973 until 30th April 1974. Despite this widely publicised measure the Government obviously condoned continued export of tusks as the East African Customs & Excise record states 72 tons were despatched to several countries during the ban. However, during this period Hong Kong records that it alone, imported 105 tons from Kenya.

Comparisons of Kenya f.o.b. ivory values with Hong Kong c.i.f. values for 1959 - 1973 are given in Table 16. Differences between them expressed as proportions of f.o.b. values range from - 0.2% to + 67%. This seems far greater than can be accounted for by f.o.b. + carriage and insurance and complements the obvious from the volume data : the Kenya/Hong Kong records are most irregular.

2. KENYA - UNITED KINGDOM

Kenya's stated ivory exports to the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom's official imports from Kenya for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973 are given in Table 17 (the U.K. authorities are unable to give data for 1968 and 1969). Overall the U.K. imports exceeded the claimed Kenya exports; 59 to 51 tons, a margin of 16%. This complements the finding of the Kenya - Hong Kong trade though it is lesser in extent.

In the years 1962 - 1967 the U.K. imports from Kenya exceeded stated Kenya exports by 6 tons or 24% of claimed exports. In 1970 - 1973, U.K. imports exceeded Kenya exports by 2 tons or 8% of claimed exports. The earlier period thus showed the greater differences and volumes. Skewing

comparisons by placing Kenya's exports 1962 - 1966 against U.K. imports 1963 - 1967 widens the differences to 37% of export volume. Similarly, comparing exports 1970 - 1972 to imports 1971 - 1973 widens the difference to 24% of export volume, but this time in favour of Kenya.

Comparisons of Kenya's f.o.b. export values with U.K. c.i.f. import values are given in Table 18. As proportions of the f.o.b. values, the differences between them range from - 65% to + 18%. As with all the data pertaining to Kenya's ivory exports, they suggest irregularities.

3. UGANDA - HONG KONG

Uganda's claimed exports to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's official imports from Uganda for the past 15 years are given in Table 19. Overall, Uganda claims to have exported 253 tons to Hong Kong, but Hong Kong only acknowledges 226 tons - a deficit of 11% of export volume. The data indicate two distinct phases. The first concerns all years prior to 1971 in which with one exception (1962) Uganda's exports to Hong Kong exceeded Hong Kong's receipts from Uganda. Thus this 12 year period gives Uganda exports of 220 tons against Hong Kong's imports of only 60 tons, a deficit of 73% of export volume.

The second phase concerns the 3 years 1971 - 1973 in which the previous trend is reversed. Uganda stated exports of 33 tons against Hong Kong's Uganda imports of 167 tons : a surplus of 406% of export volume.

In Table 20 comparison is made of Uganda's f.o.b. ivory values with Hong Kong's c.i.f. imports from Uganda. They are even more erratic

than the Kenya data and differences between f.o.b. and c.i.f. range from - 7% to + 108% of f.o.b. figures.

4. UGANDA - UNITED KINGDOM

The Uganda - United Kingdom ivory trade is given in Table 21 for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973. During this time Uganda claims to have exported 12 tons to the U.K., while the latter acknowledges import of less than 0.5 of a ton. This is in keeping with the Hong Kong data prior to 1971, and there is insufficient material for a comparison of f.o.b. and c.i.f. values.

5. TANZANIA - HONG KONG

Until April 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar were separate states each with its own Customs record. Once they merged the record was unified, making it impossible to distinguish individual ivory exports. In this section I shall consider Tanganyika and Zanzibar separately for the period 1959 - 1963 and then as one for the years 1964 - 1973. Tanganyika's, Zanzibar's and Tanzania's official exports to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's imports from them are given respectively in Tables 22 a, b and c.

Tanganyika's official exports for the 5 years 1959 - 1963 total 42 tons, while Hong Kong's imports from this source were 35 tons. As all exports went by sea at this time, there would be a lag between despatch and receipt as considered at the beginning of this chapter. A skewed comparison of the 4 years stated exports 1959 - 1962 with Hong Kong's imports 1960 - 1963, gives exports of 32 tons and imports 33 tons - a difference of 3% of export volume. This is close agreement. It may arise from compensating

for the despatch/receipt lag, it could be mere coincidence, but it could also imply that the causes of error in the Kenya and Uganda data were absent in Tanganyika between 1959 and 1963.

The 1963 records of Zanzibar's exports were never published on account of the revolution. However, the 4 years 1959 - 1962 show fairly close agreement : Zanzibar claimed exports of 306 tons, Hong Kong imports 320 tons, a difference of 4% of exports. This is slightly increased if a skewed comparison of Zanzibar's 1959 - 1962 figures are compared to Hong Kong's 1960 - 1963 imports : 306 tons exported to 326 tons imported, a difference of 6% of exports. As with Tanganyika, it would appear that the causes for discrepancy in the Kenya/Uganda/Hong Kong trade did not apply to the Zanzibar/Hong Kong figures. Further, the chances that both Tanganyika's and Zanzibar's data are close to the expected through coincidence, are greatly reduced.

Table 22 c gives Tanzania's ivory exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's receipts from 1964 - 1973. Claimed exports totalled 543 tons, Hong Kong imports were 761 tons - 40% higher than stated exports. The first 5 years, 1964 - 1968 showed very large discrepancies : Tanzania's exports were given as 216 tons, but Hong Kong's imports were 445 tons, the difference of 229 tons being 106% of exports. In the second 5 years, the discrepancies are much reduced. Exports are claimed as 327 tons, imports into Hong Kong 316 tons, the difference of 11 tons being 3% of exports.

Combining all the Tanganyika - Zanzibar - Tanzania data from 1959 - 1973 the record shows 3 phases :

- (1) the first 5 years prior to union when both Tanganyika's and Zanzibar's exports tallied approximately to Hong Kong's imports from them,
- (2) the second 5 years immediately after union when Hong Kong imported far more from Tanzania than appears in that country's records, and
- (3) the third 5 years when the Tanzanian exports once more tally closely with Hong Kong's imports.

In Tables 23 a, b and c, Tanganyika's, Zanzibar's and Tanzania's average f.o.b. ivory values are compared with Hong Kong's c.i.f. values of ivory from these countries. The data support the contention of less irregularity in Tanzania's ivory trade than in either Kenya or Uganda, but not very conclusively.

6. TANZANIA - UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom records do not separate Tanzania into its component parts and I am unable to make comparisons similar to the Tanzania - Hong Kong trade in the previous section. Tanzania's stated ivory exports to the U.K. for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973, and the U.K.'s imports from Tanzania for the same periods are presented in Table 24. Stated exports total 19 tons while imports are 38 tons, the surplus is 100% of export volume.

Comparison of Tanzania's stated f.o.b. values is made with the U.K. c.i.f. import values in Table 25. Differences range from - 14% to + 42% of f.o.b. value.

Summarising this chapter, the evidence is :-

- (1) Kenya's claimed exports to Hong Kong and the U.K. are substantially less than their corresponding imports from Kenya.
- (2) Uganda's claimed exports to Hong Kong and the U.K. are considerably more than their corresponding imports from Uganda.
- (3) Tanzania's exports to Hong Kong show fair agreement prior to the political union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and in the past 5 years. However, there was an intermediate phase in which they were as unbalanced as Kenya's. Tanzania's exports to the U.K. are much lower than the U.K.'s imports from Tanzania.
- (4) The comparisons of f.o.b. values of East African ivory exports with Hong Kong and U.K. c.i.f. import values, are of dubious value. However, the very wide range of differences suggests that the imbalances between export and import volumes are real.

CHAPTER 4

THE VALUE OF EAST AFRICA'S LOSSES

In East Africa, ivory trading is essentially illegal. A few people are licensed to exploit only part of the resource (legal tusks), yet the quantity of ivory available is far greater than that which is legalised. Further it is accessible to a far larger number of people than the authorised dealers. On the other hand ivory trading, and manufacturing from it, are open businesses in both Hong Kong and the U.K. Anyone who wishes to participate may do so. The incentive to trade illegally is therefore great in East Africa but almost non-existent in Hong Kong and the U.K. Logically therefore, it is more likely that the East African records are the source of the irregularities observed between exports and imports, than either the Hong Kong or British statistics.

Assuming this so the ivory surpluses arriving in Hong Kong and the U.K. could easily represent consignments illegally exported, but arriving in the guise of legal export. If this was the case not only would illicit tusks enter the trade, but stringent exchange control regulations in the exporting states would be by-passed. Payment for unrecorded exports could be made outside East Africa and no tax commitments incurred.

While the surplus of imports over exports has obvious reason, this is not the case with Uganda's data in which the converse is true. It seems that such a situation could only have arisen if

- (1) ivory was transhipped to some destination other than that to which it was originally consigned, while en route. Such a practice is not

uncommon in commerce today,

- (2) incorrect entries were made by the East African Customs authorities, or
- (3) incorrect records were made by the Hong Kong and United Kingdom authorities.

There are no data to support the first possibility. While that already presented suggests that the East African Customs authorities do not record a great deal of ivory leaving East Africa, there is nothing to indicate that they make entries falsely raising exports. However, as most Uganda ivory was bought by Kenya and Zanzibar traders, who mixed it with tusks from elsewhere before shipping, it is difficult to see how Customs officials identified Uganda's ivory at the time it was shipped.

The third possibility that the apparent Uganda's exports exceeded stated Hong Kong and U.K. imports through error on the part of the receiving countries has some merit. Thus it is worth noting that prior to 1970 - 1971 when Uganda commenced direct ivory exports by air from Entebbe, all the country's tusks had to be shipped through Kenya. It could be that both Hong Kong and U.K. Customs authorities incorrectly ascribed many such shipments to Kenya. In support of this is the observation that when Uganda's air-exports commenced not only did its export - import balance reverse, but the difference between Kenya's exports and corresponding imports also declined sharply. In the 4 years 1967 - 1970, Kenya's differences ranged from 314% to 678% of export volume. In the 3 years 1971 - 1973 they fell to 5% - 58% . This compels re-appraisal of both Kenya and Uganda data. Combining their exports and comparing them to combined imports in

Hong Kong and the U.K. would reduce the magnitude of anomaly in both countries' records. The necessary combinations are given in Tables 26 and 27. The joint exports to Hong Kong for the years 1959 - 1970 are 401 tons against 614 tons claimed as imports by Hong Kong; a surplus of 53% of stated export volume. The combined exports to the U.K. are 63 tons against U.K. import figures of 59 tons giving a deficit on imports of 5%. This considerable reduction of differences is persuasive. In the absence of other evidence, I accept that until 1971, Uganda's exports have probably frequently been confused with Kenya's by the receiving countries. From that year on however, they are quite separate.

The combined official East African ivory exports to Hong Kong during the past 15 years totalled 1,629 tons with an f.o.b. value of \$13,249,189. Over the same period Hong Kong claims to have received 2,303 tons of ivory with a c.i.f. valuation of \$25,340,006. As proportions of the East African records Hong Kong's imports were greater in volume by 41% (674 tons) and in value by 91% (\$12,090,818).

= 91,000
cb.
= 128,968

The combined official East African ivory exports to the United Kingdom during the 10 years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973 were 81 tons with an f.o.b. value of \$654,399. Corresponding U.K. imports were 97 tons with a c.i.f. value of \$737,046. As proportions of the East African record, the U.K.'s imports were greater in volume by 20% (16 tons) and in value by 13% (\$82,648). These combined volume and value differences are of a lower order than the East Africa/Hong Kong data. They tend to conceal the Tanzania differences which are of a much greater order : 19 tons exported to 38 tons received - an increase of 100% on the export volume. The f.o.b.

value of \$124,725 compares to the U.K. c.i.f. value of \$260,207 which is 109% (\$135,482) up on the former. (The combined Kenya/Uganda exports of 62 tons valued f.o.b. at \$529,663 compare to corresponding U.K. imports of 59 tons valued c.i.f. at \$476,839 - a deficit of \$52,824 or 10% of the f.o.b. figure.)

It seems a reasonable hypothesis that the differences between the export and import figures represent illegal transactions. I have no doubt that they apply to other countries as well as the two reviewed. A major Nairobi exporter stated unequivocally (in a verbal interview) that his company had exported over 50 tons to Peking in 1972, whereas the Customs record shows only 13 tons as having been sent there. Combined official East African exports of ivory for the period 1959 - 1973 amount to 4,087 tons with a stated f.o.b. value of \$35,308,928. However, in view of the evidence presented, these are low. It is likely that the true figures lie somewhere between the Hong Kong surplus of 41% and the Tanzania - U.K. surplus of 100% (the single Peking record covers too short a time for consideration). On this basis legal ivory exports plus illegal consignments arriving in the guise of being legal at their destination, may have been between 5,763 and 8,174 tons over the 15 years, with f.o.b. values of between \$49,785,588 and \$70,617,856. Summed, the loss to East Africa calculated as the difference between these estimates of volume and value and those given in the local Customs statistics, may have been 1,676 - 4,087 tons of ivory, and revenue of between \$14,476,660 and \$35,308,928 (of which 1973's high volumes and values would have accounted for c.\$12,860,000).

323,000
el.

458,000
el.

A final consideration is the routine procedure of understating f.o.b. values. This arises from a variety of reasons (e.g. concealment of income to avoid tax, reduction of transport charges as sea freight of ivory is based on value, avoidance of true value to permit a margin of payment to be retained overseas - among many). A concensus of opinion among ivory dealers and my personal experience indicates that f.o.b. values stated ex- East Africa are generally about two thirds that of real value. Thus the revenue losses to East Africa in the 15 years are more likely to be between \$21, 714, 990 and \$52, 963, 392, and for 1973 alone, c.\$19, 290, 000.

The comparison of export/import statistics has illustrated only one aspect of the illegal trade. It has not touched on tusks that are smuggled both out of East Africa and into their destinations. That this happens is known through the occasional discovery of tusks packed in crates, labelled as nails or textiles, or concealed in tins of ghee. Part of this system may account for the exports of ivory from Persian Gulf states to Hong Kong. By and large the Trucial Sheikhdoms, Muscat, Oman and Aden have restricted trade with Africa. Their traditional link has been through the dhow fleets which seasonally ply the East African coast. During the 15 years 1959 - 1973 the East African records give total legal exports of 97 kilos to the Gulf states. Yet during this period Hong Kong imported 71 tons valued at \$838, 545 from them. It is difficult to see how they came by this ivory, other than through the dhow trade. Some may have come from Somalia, but if only through the frequent allegation that dhows take illegal ivory, it seems more probable that it comes from Kenya and Tanzania. If this reasoning is correct, the East African losses rise by virtually another \$1, 000, 000 since 1965.

India offers a massive prospect for illegal ivory sales. Traditionally the sub-continent is a great ivory consumer. During the 1940s it was East Africa's major market. The demand for ivory is as great there, if not greater, than at any time in the past. However, India proves an anomaly among ivory consumers in that it has created a situation conducive to its own illegal trade. Since independence in 1947 stringent restrictions on luxury goods have inhibited the import of ivory. Thus in consecutive 5 year periods commencing 1945 - 1949 until the present 1970 - 1974, East African exports to India have fallen progressively : 747, 576, 456, 196, 122 to 75 tons for each 5 year period respectively. On the basis of the highest figure it could be that India's legally unfulfilled demand is of the order of 670 tons per 5 years (747 - 75 tons) or 134 tons a year. If this is being met, even in part illegally, the odds are that it is from East Africa, with its abundant elephants and Indians.

While the calculations in this chapter are crude, they illustrate that East Africa annually loses millions of dollars through ivory smuggling.

CHAPTER 5
THE INVOLVEMENT

Even in times of economic leniency, when currencies were more widely negotiable than they are today, there have been reasons for moving wealth in commodities rather than money. Not least of these is tax evasion, but where elephant tusks are largely an unlawful item, ivory dealers' burgeoning bank accounts, in which incoming funds are greater than can be explained through legitimate trade, could bring awkward questions. Since the imposition of exchange control regulations and the growth of non-negotiable national currencies such reasons are greater than ever. Ivory is a movable, available, international currency and a cryptic vehicle for transferring capital from country to country.

As Indians have been the mainstay of the ivory trade in East Africa it is not unfair to look to them as the probable organisers of much of the past illicit business. As a community, they have been subjected to a series of misfortunes, in independent East Africa, that have not affected other aliens in quite the same way. The three East African Governments have progressively made life more difficult to Asians, though their actions have not been synchronised. Chronologically, Tanzania's actions have preceded those in the other two states. As pointed out in Chapter 1, socialist financial policy effectively removed a large segment of Tanzania's Indians by 1969. Uganda set the stage with the "Common Man's Charter" in 1969 and eliminated them in 1971 - 1972. There is a waning population in Kenya which has little faith in Asians' future in the country. Tanzania's illegal ivory trade as indicated by the difference between exports and imports,

closely follows the fortunes of Indians in that country over the past 15 years. Conversely this pattern indicts them as being largely responsible for at least this aspect of the trade. To illustrate this I have taken the difference between Tanzania's official exports and Hong Kong imports, and expressed them as proportions of the stated exports, over the 15 years 1959 - 1973. These proportions I refer to as an illegality index and are illustrated in Figure 7. With reference to the figure, I present the following hypothesis :

Though tension existed between Arabs, Asians and Africans in Zanzibar, until it happened, few foresaw the revolution and bloodshed of January 1964. Many of the island's Indian traders were of stock established in the last century, were not worried by political changes, and looked forward to continued calm trading. Opposite Zanzibar on the mainland of Africa, Julius Nyerere was considered the most easy-going of the emergent African leaders and the prospect of independence in Tanganyika, both before and after this took place, did not unduly disturb the Indian community. In this aura of peace between 1959 and 1963 the ivory illegality index for Tanzania averaged an annual 1% of official exports.

In 1964 the revolution in Zanzibar and army mutiny in Tanganyika took place. The death of some 5,000 Arabs and the expulsion of many more, with Indians, made it seem that Asiatics would be singled out in any extension of the trouble. This was enhanced by Nyerere's growing socialism, his rupturing of ties with Britain over Rhodesia, and ultimately his "Arusha Declaration". Thus to safeguard capital there was an Asian rush to export wealth overseas. The ivory illegality index averaged 347% of legal exports in 1964 and 1965. It fell to 32% over the next 3 years, by which time the




FIG. 7 The difference between Tanzania's official exports and Hong Kong's corresponding imports expressed as a proportion of the former, to give an "index of illegality". Where Hong Kong imports were less than stated exports in any year the difference has been omitted.

majority of Indian traders had gone. From 1969 onwards, the ivory trade was essentially in Government hands, and in the absence of the Indians, the illegality index has fallen to an average of 8% of annual exports.

Unfortunately the Kenya and Uganda ivory data cannot be separated sufficiently to examine political trends in similar fashion. Nevertheless, verbal confirmation of my interpretation of events in Tanzania was given by 3 independent Indian ivory dealers with whom I discussed the subject in 1973. A point made by these gentlemen was that large scale illegal shipments were not just a feature of Independent Africa, but took place well back into the colonial era. While the Hong Kong data does not permit comparisons of imports from individual East African states prior to 1959, it does present combined East African records from 1952 until 1958. These are presented together with all export/import data until 1973 in Table 28. From them I have computed the annual East African illegality indices for the 22 years 1952 - 1973. They confirm an average of 50% of legal exports from 1952 - 1956. This is in keeping with what the ivory traders allege and the literature which reports widespread elephant poaching at this time in Kenya.

A vigorous drive was made in 1957 to curb illicit ivory dealing and kept up sporadically until 1961. During this period (1957 - 1961) the illegality index fell to an annual average of 4% of legal exports. It seems likely that the drive to enforce the law produced this lowered illegality.

In 1962 - 1965 the index soared, averaging 215% of legal exports. The rise in 1962 was clearly a Kenya/Uganda result, as the separated Tanzania

record indicates calm in that year. I attribute the onset of these high rates to financial apprehension over political independence in Kenya and Uganda. Between 1966 and 1969 the index fell to 37% of legal exports. From 1970 the index varies between 5% and 110%.

Indian traders admit that bribery of Customs officials was routine and included some British officials prior to independence. The 1957 anti-poaching operation produced evidence that senior British police officials accepted bribes in connection with ivory (Appendix 1). There is conclusive evidence that in the same era, some Game Department officials were also implicated (Appendix 1).

The salient point is that in East Africa the ivory trade and official corruption have gone together for a long time. In view of the commodity's value, this is not surprising. That Indians were prime movers and that corrupt white men sanctioned them is now history. Today it is Africans who dominate the trade in ivory producing countries. The only differences are the record volumes involved and the unprecedented blatancy of corruption.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to the situation in Kenya and is a summary of information presented in Appendix 1. Illegal ivory transactions concern all strata of Kenya's society. The supposed guardian of the trade - the Game Department - appears to have become a pivotal institution in the business it is supposed to suppress. Subordinate staff and wardens in the field actually indulge in poaching elephant. The Department's purchases of heavy rifle ammunition in 1973 exceeded those in all previous years, even though there was no unusual increase in 'game control' to explain it. The

Departmental ivory has been ear-marked for private sales to such as the two Assistant Ministers in the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife as well as to Margaret Kenyatta through her United Africa Corporation. The Chief Game Warden, Mr. Mutinda, is widely acknowledged within the ivory trade to be active in it himself, and most helpful to those who pay for his services. Senior Police officials are involved in the trade and prosecutions for ivory offences are frequently withdrawn nolle prosequi on instructions from the Attorney General. Such sentences as are pronounced are often ridiculously low. The Attorney General himself is said to offer cover for ivory trading - at a price. The local Press are afraid to comment on illegal ivory - except where it affects those in menial positions. Overall is the brooding figure of President Kenyatta - clearly implicated with personal instructions that certain people should be given a permit to export ivory.

This disregard for law would be a minor issue if it concerned ivory alone : but it does not. Corruption extends to all walks of national life, in business, land purchases, acquisition of citizenships to specify but few instances. It is blatant in that senior Government officials such as the country's Provincial Commissioners, many Permanent Secretaries, and Ministers themselves are wealthy beyond any savings of salary, and beyond ... the most optimistic interest rates upon their salaries if the latter were saved in toto. Further, their fortunes have amassed in only a decade. Either, as a group, they are financial geniuses - or corrupt. Within 11 years Kenyatta is said to have become among the world's richest men - and greatest landowners...

In this situation of general corruption, there is little hope that the ivory 'racket' can be tackled or contained on its own. Even though it has grown to unprecedented proportions under African 'management', it is only a small aspect of the national malaise. To approach the problem from the ivory angle alone is analogous to treating the patient's in-growing toe-nails before considering his generalised affliction of leprosy.

CHAPTER 6
AND IMPLICATIONS

The evidence is that Kenya's leaders are systematically plundering national resources. What is happening in Kenya is, however, also common elsewhere in Africa. Thus in Zaire, President Mobutu has claimed a monopoly on ivory trading through a 'fronting' state organisation. In 1973 every Minister in the Southern Regional Government of the Sudan, many senior Police and Army officers, a Judge and many lesser officials invited me to buy illegal ivory. I have had similar offers from Tanzania. In Zambia a substantial proportion of the ivory obtained during the official elephant cropping in the Luangwa Valley was disposed of illegally.

Apologists may point out that there are major differences between traditional African and modern Western moralities. Many Bantu societies were indeed structured on 'nepotic' pyramids in which leaders were expected to seize and own resources and wealth. Equally, however, they were expected to look after poorer relatives, and it was only by doing this that acquiescence to the system was maintained. This feudalistic attitude undoubtedly does predispose many Africans to practise "corruption" in our sense of the word. However, the apology based on traditional African systems collapses with the observation that much of the wealth seized does not benefit their societies at all.

The situation is particularly disappointing to conservationists. By and large they have hoped that their's was an a-political cause and would have the sympathy of leading Africans. However, their disillusion is not

peculiar to conservation. In less defined terms it applies to the whole field of economic aid. While most of the aid-giving public will accept self-interest as a motive for their donations, particularly at Government levels, it is convenient, if not essential, that they should be able to believe in a certain element of philanthropy. When aid falls short of its goals through the honest incompetence of the recipients it is disappointing. When it goes astray through their incontinent greed the philanthropic ideal disappears. Conditions of economic stringency are spreading at geometric rates throughout the world and will lower tolerance of misappropriated aid. Reluctance to continue donating will increase and heighten instability both internationally and internally in many countries.

As the euphoria of independence wanes, the effects of African corruption progressively increase in consequence. Misappropriations by the first wave of leaders provide a focus (and stimulus) for opposition. As a result they become more reliant on outside help to maintain position, vulnerable to blackmail and increasingly apprehensive about exposure. When they are eventually overthrown, causes and policies with which they have been closely connected (e.g. conservation!) tend to be discredited. Thus it becomes more difficult to enter into long-term arrangements and agreements.

In the hands of the politically active and astute, knowledge of corruption in Africa (and elsewhere) becomes a multi-bladed weapon. It can be used to influence internal politics. For example, both China and Somalia have vested interests in Kenya. Both have extensive knowledge of Kenyatta's involvement in ivory (Somalis being particularly active in elephant poaching in Kenya). Both could use this to their advantage in discreet blackmail,

open exposure, or, more likely than either, as a useful primer for their own 'candidates' in Kenya. The knowledge can also be used, for example, to influence international aid policies against the demands of recipient countries. It can be used to stir up hostile reactions in the electorates of donor countries toward governments giving aid to obviously corrupt systems. Finally, it can be used to disconnect sources of charitable money from corrupt recipients, or discredit agencies donating to such countries.

The World Wildlife Fund provides a minor example of what I mean. In August 1974, the Fund's President, H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands decorated Jomo Kenyatta with the Order of the Golden Ark - a premier award for services to conservation. (Actually this is a personal award by Prince Bernhard, but the World Wildlife Fund has so basked in its glory that it is widely held to be a WWF decoration.) If it was publicised that he was aware of Kenyatta involvement in illegal ivory when the award was made, both his and the Fund's ability to raise further revenue from charity would be severely compromised.

Knowledge of the type presented in this report is powerful political material. How and when it could or should be used would of course depend on the objectives of the user. There has been a strong drive from conservationists and the Press to emblazon data on the ivory trade across the media headlines. However, I sense the urge here is punitive and not necessarily constructive. If there is purpose to publicly attack and criticise the Kenya regime, for example, it should be done with the full broadside of evidence on corruption. To fire the 'Ivory shot' alone would pain Kenyatta, damage his credence overseas a little (but not in Africa) and

guarantee a vindictive response towards white men in general, for it is really only they who fear for elephants. The occasion in which I can see purpose in taking such action would be to assist in drastic political reorganisation. While such a point may arise, I cannot see justification at present, if for no other reason that there appear no suitable alternatives. On the other hand the knowledge of ivory and other corruption could be used without publicity to secure changes in present practice. Such recourse is pointless, however, without an unequivocal goal.

This brings me to the major point of the report : it is the need for determining what our goals are. Why do we give aid to African countries, and why do we feel affronted when Africans despoil elephants ? At all levels in the "western" approach to Africa, we conceal our motives with flummery - to the point where we are considerably deceived ourselves. The situation is now so ridiculous that even these self-deceptions are too threadbare to stand much further use. Thus what should our reactions be when Kenya claims help for a foreign exchange deficit of \$140, 000, 000, because of "increased oil prices", when it is obvious that a substantial part of this could be recovered from official corruption ? Should we give aid in such circumstances ? If so, what is the quid pro quo that warrants it ? Philanthropy certainly does not fit.

Such fundamental questions may seem very far from the issues of conservation which inspired the report. However, if basic human to human affairs lack realism then all subordinate affairs (which conservation and concern for environment are) will be deprived of a sound base. Scandals such as the ivory issue will continue to arise as milestones in

aimless wanderings. Golden Arks and Environmental Programmes will exist as sad monuments to unattained hopes. If we want the rule of law, as perceived by westerners (and to which Africans in public pay lip-service) to prevail in Africa, then westerners must involve themselves in African affairs. If we want elephants to survive in Africa we will have to take strong action to ensure it happens. To date, white men have financed independent Africa and "advised" from the sidelines, drawing up strict rules which bar themselves from the internal affairs of the various countries. To now break these rules will invoke all manner of criticism. This would be unavoidable. If we are unwilling to pay it, then where Africa is concerned, we should shut up. In which case we either give aid in the spirit of true philanthropy - not asking what is to be done with it (do you ask the beggar in the street what he is going to do with your 50 cents?), or we stop doing so altogether. To continue our present unrewarding path is pointless.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Re-exported</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Re-exported</u>	<u>Total</u>
1906	7.805	**	7.805*	1947	25.707	139.800	165.507
07	12.829	**	12.829*	48	19.712	42.321	62.033
08	10.346	**	10.346*	49	23.116	4.877	27.993
09	13.878	**	13.878*	1950	25.606	36.478	62.084
1910	8.135*	**	8.135*	51	22.507	99.680	122.187
11	2.085*	**	2.085*	52	14.784	80.831	95.615
12	3.506*	**	3.506*	53	16.918	121.323	138.241
13	4.264*	**	4.264*	54	15.741	43.411	59.152
1924	20.601	**	20.601*	55	33.159	68.678	101.837
25	16.303	10.368	26.671	56	31.889	78.385	110.274
26	14.915	6.147	21.062	57	23.905	64.323	88.228
27	25.575	17.071	42.646	58	26.310	50.760	77.070
28	14.899	7.062	21.961	59	27.262	46.178	73.440
29	12.224	22.608	34.832	1960	29.621	53.345	82.966
1930	16.275	13.362	29.637	61	32.615	99.297	131.912
31	13.280	15.038	28.318	62	40.826	0.090	40.916
32	13.941	25.657	39.598	63	42.096	-	42.096
33	18.998	26.622	45.620	64	39.120	-	39.120
34	21.162	34.802	55.964	65	29.311	-	29.311
35	19.506	63.557	83.063	66	45.213	-	45.213
36	18.145	58.274	76.419	67	48.350	-	48.350
37	15.877	56.749	72.626	68	38.572	-	38.572
38	13.307	46.131	59.438	69	33.388	-	33.388
39	12.396	48.062	60.458	1970	44.383	-	44.383
1940	11.126	56.597	67.723	71	82.727	-	82.727
41	12.542	63.456	75.998	72	150.248	-	150.248
42	5.639	122.376	128.015	73	268.308	-	268.308
43	5.893	72.651	78.544				
44	13.209	52.482	65.691				
45	14.733	83.676	98.409				
46	34.751	82.101	116.852				
					<u>1,659.539</u>	<u>2,014.626</u>	<u>3,674.165</u>

*Incomplete Game Dept. data

**No records obtained

TABLE 1 Kenya's ivory exports in tons from 1924 - 1973, with incomplete data from 1906 - 1923. The main body of data is from Customs and Excise records; that marked with one asterisk is incomplete, and with two asterisks, missing.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic Exports Tons</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic Exports Tons</u>
1929	18.462	1956	22.454
1930	13.699	57	23.996
31	18,372	58	20.322
32	25.493	59	31.436
33	23.679	1960	29.803
34	20.549	61	20.730
35	27.032	62	37.151
36	29.155	63	29.258
37	33.319	64	45.703
38	21.139	65	44.302
39	28.349	66	57.407
1940	25.961	67	60.093
41	23.421	68	62.719
42	14.835	69	32.445
43	12.193	1970	52.072
44	19.611	71	31.428
45	28.959	72	31.551
46	35.360	73	<u>25.212</u>
47	21.993		
48	26.215	Total	<u>1,280.422</u>
49	23.421		
1950	30.636		
51	24.234		
52	19.560		
53	17.934		
54	16.577		
55	22.182		

TABLE 2 Uganda's domestic ivory exports for the years 1929 - 1973 in tons, from Customs and Excise Records.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Re-exported</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Re-exported</u>	<u>Total</u>
1929	15.750	28.298	44.048	1953	49.540	0.914	50.454
1930	13.006	5.995	19.001	54	50.034	3.221	53.255
31	17.528	13.768	31.296	55	59.515	0.907	60.422
32	26.266	7.976	34.242	56	54.298	0.726	55.024
33	23.726	5.385	29.111	57	59.832	0.544	60.376
34	33.631	32.109	65.740	58	51.622	-	51.622
35	23.167	40.136	63.303	59	68.768	1.134	69.902
36	32.871	42.270	75.141	1960	65.956	-	65.956
37	29.213	30.585	59.798	61	66.954	4.944	71.898
38	28.756	19.458	48.214	62	66.773	-	66.773
39	18.544	-	18.544	63	91.086	-	91.086
1940	29.873	5.233	35.106	64	80.927	0.721	81.648
41	20.017	1.473	21.490	65	88.306	-	88.306
42	21.491	0.356	21.847	66	118.334	-	118.334
43	11.228	12.142	23.370	67	93.949	-	93.949
44	33.684	15.292	48.976	68	109.188	-	109.188
45	23.421	32.465	55.886	69	161.160	-	161.160
46	64.116	31.144	95.260	1970	161.344	-	161.344
47	46.436	19.204	65.640	71	132.225	-	132.225
48	47.452	1.169	48.621	72	250.937	-	250.937
49	47.808	1.169	48.977	73	64.361	-	64.361
1950	43.134	0.102	43.236	Totals	<u>2,674.060</u>	<u>358.891</u>	<u>3,032.951</u>
51	41.609	0.051	41.660				
52	36.224	-	36.224				

TABLE 3 Tanganyika's ivory exports in tons 1929 - 1963 and Tanzania's exports 1964 - 1973. The latter set of data should include any Zanzibar exports. All data are derived from the Customs and Excise records.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports Tons</u>	<u>Exports Tons</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports Tons</u>	<u>Exports Tons</u>
1925	26.317	27.384	1952	147.792	152.321
26	40.695	90.230	53	128.283	84.591
27	29.772	29.467	54	147.792	152.321
28	15.902	17.985	55	155.057	148.808
29	17.985	17.883	56	185.337	203.678
1930	17.934	17.020	57	220.088	189.757
31	10.618	11.939	58	161.103	126.759
32	21.910	21.148	59	259.614	150.180
33	24.844	14.988	1960	209.521	197.480
34	34.243	40.644	61	152.619	168.470
35	43.037	45.674	62	228.014	201.595
36	62.387	59.442	63	?	?
37	58.020	59.036	64	?	?
38	39.423	44.404	65	?	?
39	40.797	41.609	66	?	?
1940	70.841	53.346	67	?	?
41	96.377	79.205	68	?	?
42	80.171	58.828	69	?	?
43	91.399	63.151	70	?	?
44	66.606	95.463	71	?	?
45	65.897	62.338	72	?	?
46	119.494	108.367	73	?	?
47	57.613	87.487			
48	168.978	95.260	Totals	<u>3,642.261</u>	<u>3,456.961</u>
49	108.774	123.186			
1950	105.472	150.069			
51	131.535	165.448			

(Difference : Imports 185.300 tons more than exports)

TABLE 4 Zanzibar's imports and exports of ivory in tons from 1925 until 1964, after which it is assumed that its data are included in the Tanganyika - Tanzania figures in Table 3. The data are from Customs and Excise records.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports Tons</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports Tons</u>
1929	115.225	1956	391.430
1930	79.357	57	362.357
31	89.925	58	275.773
32	120.481	59	324.958
33	113.398	1960	376.205
34	182.897	61	393.010
35	219.072	62	346.435
36	240.157	63	162.440
37	224.779	64	166.471
38	173.195	65	161.919
39	148.960	66	220.954
1940	182.136	67	202.392
41	200.114	68	210.479
42	223.525	69	226.993
43	177.258	1970	257.799
44	229.741	71	246.380
45	245.592	72	432.736
46	355.839	73	<u>357.881</u>
47	340.627		
48	232.129	Total	<u>11,083.644</u>
49	223.577		
1950	286.025		
51	353.529		
52	303.720		
53	291.220		
54	281.305		
55	333.249		

TABLE 5 Ivory exports of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar combined, in tons for the years 1929 - 1973. Data from Customs and Excise records.

Country	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total	As a % of Total Exports
United Kingdom	4.823	6.623	11.361	7.038	14.756	6.395	11.210	16.436	7.455	12.759	6.219	4.058	109.133	4.21)
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	18	.00)
Netherlands	-	136	18.836	13.904	11.021	6.336	246	2.295	3.008	5.186	7.331	238	68.537	2.64)
Belgium	-	-	62	86	-	287	20	159	512	114	3.258	2.921	7.419	0.29)
France	446	499	625	1.390	1.518	1.125	546	699	1.207	322	900	713	9.990	0.39)
F.R. Germany	2.627	862	1.666	4.819	5.980	5.668	2.741	3.186	10.933	6.085	4.518	11.456	60.541	2.33)
Italy	2.132	2.631	2.091	1.550	3.403	4.144	2.281	3.637	3.236	4.328	4.086	4.657	38.176	1.47)
Spain	136	181	391	1.180	1.801	1.613	1.073	1.909	1.785	1.877	1.599	2.739	16.284	0.63)
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	142	18	129	126	229	44	292	124	1.104	0.04)
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	140	364	345	504	62	-	261	1.676	0.06) 12.24
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	182	-	-	182	0.01)
Sweden	136	45	120	-	64	-	36	91	45	-	20	-	557	0.02)
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	45	978	-	-	40	1.073	0.04)
Finland	-	-	-	71	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	101	0.01)
Denmark	227	46	187	111	446	207	119	2	68	140	159	345	2.056	0.08)
Greece	-	91	-	33	-	-	-	52	-	-	-	107	283	0.01)
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	48	.00)
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	13	-	13	.00)
Cyprus	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	78	111	-	-	234	0.01)
U.S.S.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	-	49	.00)
U.S.A.	11.409	7.258	7.175	10.051	12.169	14.335	11.936	13.805	15.212	11.096	10.670	8.515	133.631	5.15)
Canada	-	91	244	240	213	372	773	78	153	250	341	245	3.000	0.12)
Brazil	-	-	56	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	.00)
Argentina	-	-	120	248	-	122	130	134	31	-	320	515	1.620	0.06) 5.47
C & S America	-	-	270	191	-	348	185	413	403	404	603	761	3.578	0.14)
Trinidad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	11	.00)
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	-	-	90	.00)
Iran	198	-	8	-	-	-	-	196	174	-	-	-	576	0.02)
Bahrain	45	-	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111	0.01)
Algeria	-	-	-	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	.00)
Japan	45.993	635	3.605	8.939	12.474	20.724	14.001	20.342	42.835	19.077	222.175	52.318	463.118	17.85)
China	-	-	-	-	6.827	1.909	292	-	6.662	61.804	42.597	80.365	200.456	7.73)
S. Korea	-	-	-	-	-	228	227	-	-	-	-	71	526	0.02)
Taiwan	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.030	-	-	3.075	0.12)
Hong Kong	108.320	20.458	50.906	51.513	99.669	102.801	120.778	129.092	133.467	102.675	114.136	184.325	1,218.140	46.95) 82.14
Singapore	-	454	-	-	190	320	210	224	300	319	-	-	2.017	0.08)
Malaya	-	-	251	189	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	440	0.02)
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	59	-	-	87	-	-	-	146	0.01)
Burma	2.896	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.896	0.11)
India	64.492	499	933	14.565	13.677	8.605	41.867	32.636	27.644	16.055	13.114	2.973	237.060	9.14)
Pakistan	-	-	227	-	58	117	609	173	416	56	28	-	1.684	0.06)
Ceylon	323	136	-	-	52	19	-	-	-	80	-	-	610	0.02)
Australia	-	91	-	-	41	-	28	187	97	28	18	7	497	0.02)
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	41	.00)
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	-	51	.00)
Seychelles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	86	.00) 0.02
Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	27	.00)
Madagascar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84	84	.00)
South Africa	91	181	112	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	384	0.01)
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	81	-	22	18	19	-	-	-	140	0.01)
Zambia	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	94	-	70	-	209	0.01)
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	-	-	-	-	56	.00)
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	42	.00)
Ethiopia	-	-	46	64	42	206	92	67	112	20	-	-	649	0.03) 0.13
Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	54	65	.00)
Libya	-	-	99	-	122	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	221	0.01)
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	24	.00)
Others	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	702	20	187	291	224	1.437	0.06)
Totals	244.339	40.916	99.502	116.271	184.773	176.122	209.925	227.250	257.799	246.381	432.800	358.294	2,594.372	100.00

TABLE 6 The tonnage and destination of combined East African exports of ivory for the years 1962 - 1973.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount Tons</u>	<u>Value \$ per kg.</u>	<u>Total Value \$</u>
1952	71.386	4.53	323,485.48
53	107.879	5.08	547,831.34
54	86.480	7.20	622,567.02
55	93.210	5.18	482,458.23
56	144.653	5.45	788,201.27
57	126.151	5.59	704,777.64
58	145.059	5.91	857,825.37
59	220.172	4.72	1,040,101.40
1960	157.750	6.30	994,297.73
61	115.111	5.91	680,157.51
62	212.803	5.82	1,240,576.80
63	149.532	6.14	918,455.99
64	243.640	6.40	1,560,393.80
65	276.399	7.75	2,142,525.70
66	234.595	7.14	1,674,283.80
67	223.017	6.52	1,453,394.00
68	329.927	6.20	2,046,972.30
69	299.110	6.62	1,980,306.70
1970	267.441	9.44	2,525,921.80
71	260.006	11.10	2,886,536.60
72	261.510	12.10	3,163,071.40
73	<u>597.121</u>	<u>30.63</u>	<u>18,291,672.00</u>
Totals	<u>4,622.952</u>	<u>10.15</u>	<u>46,925,813.88</u>

TABLE 7 The tonnage, average annual value per kilo and the total value in U.S. \$, of Hong Kong's raw ivory imports from 1952 to 1973.

Country	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total	As a % of	
																	Total	Total Imports
Belgium	3.184	0.844	-	0.602	0.844	0.155	1.956	-	1.192	1.629	-	1.267	-	1.414	1.135	14.222	0.36)
Netherlands	2.371	-	0.457	5.232	13.580	6.314	3.967	9.137	4.345	14.504	1.624	1.808	1.763	2.061	0.982	68.145	1.77)
Belgium	93.695	27.576	6.124	35.247	11.935	16.937	36.063	23.495	24.203	73.959	18.353	12.293	15.976	24.897	58.995	479.748	12.47)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.768	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.768	0.15)
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.145	2.145	0.06)
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.549	10.549	0.27)
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.935	11.062	11.997	0.31)	
U.S.A.	-	-	-	1.313	-	1.991	1.159	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.108	4.571	0.12	0.12
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.640	-	0.502	1.906	1.651	20.899	26.598	0.69)
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.881	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.881	0.02)
Thailand	0.014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.065	-	0.256	0.335	0.01)
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-	0.045	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.045	-)
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.924	0.924	0.02)
Malaysia	-	-	-	-	0.362	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.362	0.01)
Ceylon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.257	-	-	-	3.257	0.08)
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.135	2.135	0.06)
Malawi	0.061	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.061	-	2.78
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-)
Tanzania	-	-	0.192	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.769	10.444	4.084	0.019	-	16.508	0.43)
Zambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.988	2.658	3.320	2.091	1.722	12.269	8.559	11.328	42.935	1.16)
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.571	-	1.270	1.984	-	-	-	-	-	3.825	0.10)
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.650	-	7.650	0.20)
Kenya	5.604	3.430	-	8.698	3.297	3.324	9.714	1.262	-	3.582	3.629	9.684	8.874	22.094	48.200	131.392	3.41)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.988	-	0.455	16.453	24.464	6.900	0.077	1.482	55.819	1.45)
U.S.A.	-	0.415	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.256	-	7.148	7.819	0.20)
Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.722	7.311	-	-	1.023	11.056	0.29)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	33.878	43.396	8.549	4.440	10.649	41.936	5.275	2.025	14.915	5.274	170.337	4.43)	
Kenya	23.879	28.268	36.020	35.558	14.656	44.622	25.729	40.854	95.093	89.056	58.901	61.795	49.793	46.673	223.050	873.947	22.70)
Kenya	-	-	1.799	2.034	2.837	0.364	-	3.530	-	1.506	9.013	20.428	34.823	17.695	113.982	208.011	5.40)
Kenya	83.668	82.142	67.368	112.623	96.255	108.579	117.279	70.648	64.153	84.287	100.962	57.403	66.929	58.769	31.529	1202.594	31.24)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.570	6.500	4.027	17.608	15.739	15.999	16.651	2.132	8.805	89.031	2.31	81.71
Kenya	-	-	-	1.210	3.103	2.320	9.072	-	3.274	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.979	0.49)
Mozambique	8.150	14.468	2.900	9.452	2.493	24.933	25.428	54.890	15.357	23.319	22.778	33.934	20.065	41.608	28.136	327.911	8.52)
Kenya	-	0.608	0.252	0.835	0.167	0.177	0.073	2.987	3.005	1.548	5.863	0.869	1.613	1.200	4.676	23.873	0.62)
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.578	8.704	9.086	3.299	24.667	0.64)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.422	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.422	0.01)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.074	-	0.074	-)
Total	220.626	157.751	115.112	212.804	149.529	243.639	276.399	234.596	223.017	329.927	299.111	267.444	260.007	261.509	597.122	3848.593	100.00	
Countries per annum	9	8	8	11	11	13	14	13	12	16	13	18	18	19	24	36		

TABLE 8 The tonnages of Hong Kong's raw ivory imports for the years 1959 - 1973 with countries of origin and their overall contributions as a percentage of the gross imports.

Year	Japan	China	North Vietnam	Malaya	Thailand	India	South Korea	Singapore	Malagasy	Iran	Germany	Italy	U. S. A.	U. S. Oceania	Total
1962	-	35.035	2.913	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.948
63	-	35.431	-	0.318	0.386	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.135
64	3.626	70.816	2.000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	76.442
65	1.522	66.264	-	-	0.094	-	0.227	-	-	-	-	0.057	0.226	-	68.390
66	14.934	44.535	0.998	-	0.582	-	-	-	-	0.060	-	-	0.123	-	61.232
67	2.226	29.083	1.016	-	0.167	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32.492
68	6.258	45.796	0.998	-	0.983	-	-	-	-	-	0.036	-	0.012	-	54.083
69	20.362	13.692	-	-	0.939	2.026	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.059	37.078
70	28.278	3.423	-	-	0.971	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32.672
71	18.253	25.663	2.002	-	0.512	-	0.196	0.043	0.015	-	-	-	-	0.202	46.886
Totals	95.459	369.738	9.927	0.318	4.634	2.026	0.423	0.043	0.015	0.060	0.036	0.057	0.361	0.261	483.358
%	19.75	76.49	2.06	0.07	0.96	0.42	0.09	0.01	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.05	100.00

TABLE 9 The tonnage of Hong Kong's Re-exports of raw ivory, recipient countries and their imports as a percentage of total Re-exports over the 10 year period.

Year	HONG KONG IMPORTS			HONG KONG RE-EXPORTS				Difference between import and re-export value per kg. as a % of import value
	Tons	Total value	per kg	Tons	% of	Total value	per kg	
		U.S. \$	\$		imports	U.S. \$	\$	
1962	212.804	1,240,576.80	5.83	37.948	17.8	278,105.80	7.33	+ 25.7
63	149.529	918,455.99	6.14	36.135	24.2	263,977.00	7.31	+ 19.1
64	243.639	1,560,393.80	6.40	76.442	31.4	589,476.00	7.71	+ 20.5
65	276.399	2,142,525.70	7.75	68.390	24.7	558,895.70	8.17	+ 5.4
66	234.596	1,674,283.80	7.14	61.232	26.1	448,437.20	7.32	+ 2.5
67	223.017	1,453,394.00	6.52	32.492	14.6	291,731.80	8.98	+ 37.7
68	329.927	2,046,972.30	6.20	54.083	16.4	468,769.60	8.67	+ 39.8
69	299.111	1,980,306.70	6.62	37.078	12.4	304,213.90	8.20	+ 23.9
1970	267.444	2,525,921.80	9.44	32.672	12.2	416,045.30	12.73	+ 34.9
71	260.007	2,886,536.60	11.10	46.886	18.0	792,587.90	16.90	+ 52.3
Total	2496.473	18,429,367.49	7.38	483.358	19.4	4412,240.20	9.13	+ 23.7

TABLE 10 The tonnage and value of Hong Kong's imports of raw ivory compared with re-exports of raw ivory, and the difference between import value per kilo and re-export value per kilo shown as a percentage of the former. On average over 10 years, re-exports comprised 19.4% of imports, but were 23.7% more valuable per unit weight.

Year	Raw ivory Imports retained in Hong Kong	Finished ivory Exports worked in Hong Kong
	<u>U.S. \$</u>	<u>U.S. \$</u>
1962	1, 017, 656.10	1, 207, 151.10
63	696, 257.60	1, 237, 715.50
64	1, 070, 067.20	1, 460, 374.50
65	1, 612, 069.70	1, 559, 436.40
66	1, 237, 811.80	1, 893, 491.20
67	1, 242, 223.00	2, 307, 014.50
68	1, 710, 232.80	2, 766, 813.90
69	1, 734, 651.80	3, 966, 886.90
1970	2, 216, 219.30	3, 198, 722.40
71	<u>2, 365, 632.00</u>	<u>3, 994, 030.80</u>
Totals	<u>14, 902, 821.30</u>	<u>23, 591, 637.20</u>

Export values are \$8, 688, 815.90 greater than import values of raw ivory : a 'profit' of 58%.

TABLE 11 A comparison of the annual values of raw ivory imports retained in Hong Kong and of finished ivory exports that were manufactured in Hong Kong. Data for 1972 and 1973 not obtained in time for this report.

Year	Hong Kong Finished ivory Imports	Hong Kong Finished ivory Re-exports
	<u>U.S. \$</u>	<u>U.S. \$</u>
1962	259, 249.80	64, 515.30
63	264, 320.60	63, 508.60
64	354, 618.00	81, 593.30
65	306, 547.90	38, 141.80
66	606, 325.80	51, 907.60
67	11, 141.40	67, 839.30
68	275, 320.90	70, 041.60
69	590, 672.20	200, 031.20
1970	870, 791.40	126, 332.90
71	554, 252.80	179, 953.30
72	1, 011, 704.50	413, 790.00
73	<u>1, 657, 351.70</u>	<u>448, 589.50</u>
Totals	<u>6, 762, 297.00</u>	<u>1, 806, 244.40</u>

Re-exports are only 26.7% of import values.

TABLE 12 The values of Hong Kong's annual imports of finished ivory compared with the value of Re-exports.

Year	India	China	Japan	Macau	Thailand	Malaya	Aden	Singapore	Mozambique	U. S. A.	U. K.	South Vietnam	Ceylon	North Vietnam	Total
1962	8,279	228,461	21,854	398	259	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	259,251
63	10,569	232,400	19,339	1,621	-	392	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	264,321
64	22,518	316,972	3,852	5,239	-	-	1,989	3,302	747	-	-	-	-	-	354,619
65	975	301,646	2,197	1,731	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	306,549
66	-	605,514	811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	606,325
67	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,846	5,295	-	-	-	11,141
68	-	266,583	4,115	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,044	-	3,578	-	-	275,320
69	202	590,088	382	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	590,672
70	-	860,910	8,854	132	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	895	-	870,791
71	211	521,452	29,212	424	-	-	-	-	-	2,954	-	-	-	-	554,253
72	14,869	952,285	25,291	-	-	-	-	12,111	-	-	-	-	6,197	951	1011,704
73	2,503	1605,943	24,521	-	-	-	-	18,496	-	382	-	-	5,506	-	1657,351
Totals	60,126	6482,254	140,428	9,545	259	392	1,989	33,909	747	10,226	5,295	3,578	12,598	951	6762,297
%	0.89	95.86	2.08	0.14	-	0.01	0.03	0.50	0.01	0.15	0.08	0.05	0.19	0.01	100.00

TABLE 13 Suppliers of finished ivory to Hong Kong, with value of annual exports to Hong Kong in U.S. \$

	NORTH	C & S				
<u>EUROPE</u>	<u>AMERICA</u>	<u>AMERICA</u>	<u>AFRICA</u>	<u>ASIA</u>	<u>ARABIA</u>	<u>ELSEWHERE</u>
Austria	Canada	Argentina*	Algeria	Afghani-	Aden	Australia
Belgium**	Mexico	Bolivia	Angola*	stan	Bahrein**	Bahamas
Channel Islands	U. S. A.*** (3)	Brazil	Burundi	Cambodia	Israel	Barbados
Cyprus		Chile*	C. A. R.	China	Jordan	British
Denmark		Colombia	Congo	Formosa	Kuwait	Carib. Ter.
Finland		Costa Rica	Ethiopia	India	Persian Gulf	Fiji
France***		Dominican Republic	Ivory Coast	Iran	Sheikh.	Fr. & Nth
German Federal Rep.**		Ecuador	Kenya	Japan***	Qatar	West Indies*
Gibraltar		El Salvador	Liberia	Korea	Saudi Arabia	Jamaica
Greece		Guatamala	Libya	South	States	Leeward Islands
Irish Rep.		Haiti	Malagasy Rep.	Laos	Trucial States	New Zealand
Italy***		Honduras	Malawi	Macau		Pacific Islands
Lebanon		Panama*	Mauritius	Malaya*		Phillipines
Malta		Paraguay	Morocco	Morocco**		Tonga & W. Samoa
Netherlands		Peru	Mozam.-bique*	North Borneo		Trinidad & Tobago
Norway		Uruguay	Nigeria	North Vietnam		U. S. Oceania*
Portugal		Venezuela (17)	Portuguese Guinea	South Vietnam**		West Indies Fed.
Spain***			Rhodesia	Taiwan		(16)
Sweden			Rwanda	Thailand		
Switzerland**			Senegal	(19)		
Turkey			Somalia			
U. K. (22)			South Africa*			
			Spanish Guinea			
			Spanish W. Africa**			
			Sudan			
			Tanzania			
			Togo			
			Uganda			
			Zaire			
			(30)			

TABLE 14 Countries that have imported finished ivory from Hong Kong between 1962 and 1973. * More than 1%; ** More than 2%; *** More than 5%.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Kenya Exports to Hong Kong Tons</u>	<u>Hong Kong Imports from Kenya Tons</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Kenya Exports %</u>
1959	12.701	23.879	+ 183.6
1960	22.862	28.268	+ 23.6
61	36.516	36.020	- 1.4
62	6.804	35.558	+ 422.6
63	7.213	14.656	+ 103.2
64	11.780	44.621	+ 278.8
65	7.639	25.729	+ 236.8
66	17.779	40.854	+ 129.8
67	17.579	95.093	+ 440.9
68	17.332	89.056	+ 413.8
69	7.570	58.901	+ 678.1
1970	14.924	61.795	+ 314.1
71	31.438	49.793	+ 58.4
72	44.457	46.673	+ 5.0
73	<u>146.757</u>	<u>223.050</u>	+ <u>52.0</u>
Totals	<u>403.351</u>	<u>873.946</u>	+ <u>116.5</u>

TABLE 15 The tonnage of Kenya's stated exports compared with Hong Kong's stated imports for the years 1959 - 1973, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the Kenya exports.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Kenya f.o.b. value for Hong Kong \$ per kg.</u>	<u>Hong Kong c.i.f. value for Kenya ivory \$ per kg.</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Kenya f.o.b. value %</u>
1959	3.63	6.05	+ 66.7
1960	4.97	6.44	+ 29.6
61	4.58	5.67	+ 23.8
62	3.77	5.98	+ 58.6
63	4.14	5.92	+ 43.0
64	5.03	7.20	+ 43.0
65	6.06	7.82	+ 29.0
66	6.02	7.36	+ 18.6
67	5.14	6.26	+ 19.5
68	5.20	6.20	+ 26.5
69	5.54	6.92	+ 27.8
1970	9.18	10.72	+ 16.8
71	7.77	11.53	+ 48.4
72	11.29	11.29	- 0.2
73	27.64	10.45	+ 10.2

TABLE 16 C.i.f. values of Hong Kong's imports of Kenya ivory compared with the f.o.b. values of Kenya's exports to Hong Kong, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

<u>Year</u>	Kenya Exports to the U.K.	United Kingdom Imports from Kenya	
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons</u>	
1962	2.041	1.118	
63	4.854	2.134	
64	4.971	4.928	
65	4.619	5.538	
66	6.625	11.736	
67	3.351	7.418	
1970	5.404	9.653	
71	11.455	9.958	
72	4.933	3.201	
73	<u>2.613</u>	<u>3.455</u>	
Totals	<u>50.866</u>	<u>59.134</u>	= + 16.3%

TABLE 17 Kenya's claimed exports to the United Kingdom, and the U.K.'s imports from Kenya for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973.

<u>Year</u>	Kenya f.o.b. value for the U.K.	United Kingdom c.i.f. value of Kenya Imports	Difference as a proportion of Kenya f.o.b. value
	<u>\$ per kg</u>	<u>\$ per kg</u>	<u>%</u>
1962	6.62	7.52	+ 13.6
63	5.55	6.56	+ 18.2
64	5.76	6.25	+ 8.5
65	6.25	6.58	+ 5.3
66	5.50	5.25	- 4.5
67	5.46	4.91	- 10.1
1970	8.39	2.96	- 64.7
71	7.83	10.52	+ 34.4
72	11.46	10.41	- 9.2
73	36.78	32.49	- 11.7

TABLE 18 C.i.f. values of U.K.'s imports of Kenya's ivory compared with the f.o.b. values of Kenya's exports to the U.K., with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uganda Exports to Hong Kong Tons</u>	<u>Hong Kong Imports from Uganda Tons</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Uganda Exports %</u>
1959	3.629	Nil	- 100.0
1960	4.854	Nil	- 100.0
61	5.625	1.799	- 68.0
62	6.078	20.345	+ 234.7
63	3.856	2.837	- 26.4
64	16.985	0.364	- 97.9
65	15.076	Nil	- 100.0
66	26.050	3.530	- 86.4
67	36.023	Nil	- 100.0
68	43.100	1.506	- 96.5
69	22.971	9.013	- 60.8
1970	36.178	20.428	- 43.5
71	12.030	34.823	+ 189.5
72	8.292	17.695	+ 113.4
73	<u>12.306</u>	<u>113.982</u>	<u>+ 826.2</u>
Totals	<u>253.053</u>	<u>226.322</u>	- <u>10.6</u>

TABLE 19 The tonnage of Uganda's stated ivory exports to Hong Kong, compared with Hong Kong's stated imports from Uganda for the 15 years 1959 - 1973, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the official Uganda exports.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uganda f.o.b. value for Hong Kong \$ per kg.</u>	<u>Hong Kong c.i.f. value for Uganda ivory \$ per kg.</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Uganda f.o.b. value %</u>
1959	3.04	no imports	-
1960	4.07	no imports	-
61	4.15	4.37	+ 5.3
62	4.96	6.57	+ 32.5
63	4.27	8.88	+ 108.0
64	5.22	7.91	+ 51.5
65	6.00	no imports	-
66	6.02	8.14	+ 35.2
67	5.07	no imports	-
68	5.27	7.34	+ 39.3
69	5.74	6.87	+ 19.7
1970	7.99	9.75	+ 22.0
71	5.76	10.49	+ 82.1
72	8.83	10.92	+ 23.7
73	31.55	29.29	- 7.2

TABLE 20 C.i.f. values of Hong Kong's imports of Uganda ivory compared with the f.o.b. values of Uganda's exports to Hong Kong, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uganda Exports to United Kingdom Tons</u>	<u>United Kingdom Imports from Uganda Tons</u>
1962	0.454	-
63	0.726	-
64	5.076	-
65	1.756	-
66	1.819	-
67	0.341	-
1970	0.251	0.102
71	0.151	-
72	0.481	-
73	<u>0.799</u>	<u>0.203</u>
Totals	<u>11.854</u>	<u>0.305</u>

TABLE 21 Uganda's claimed exports to the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom's imports from Uganda for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Tanganyika Exports to Hong Kong Tons</u>	<u>Hong Kong Imports from Tanganyika Tons</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Tanganyika Exports %</u>
1959	6.033	2.641	- 43.8
1960	7.711	10.027	+ 30.0
61	8.210	4.660	- 43.2
62	10.796	8.869	- 17.8
63	<u>9.390</u>	<u>9.020</u>	- <u>3.9</u>
Totals	<u>42.140</u>	<u>35.217</u>	- <u>16.4</u>

TABLE 22 a The tonnage of Tanganyika's stated ivory exports to Hong Kong, compared with Hong Kong's official imports from Tanganyika for the 5 years 1959 - 1963, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the stated Tanganyika exports.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Zanzibar Exports to Hong Kong Tons</u>	<u>Hong Kong Imports from Zanzibar Tons</u>	<u>Difference as a proportion of Zanzibar Exports %</u>
1959	75.496	81.027	+ 7.3
60	72.093	72.115	+ 0.03
61	74.074	62.708	- 15.3
62	84.641	103.754	+ 22.6
63	no records published	<u>87.236</u>	—
Totals	306.304	406.840	
Totals 1959- 1962 only	<u>306.304</u>	<u>319.604</u>	+ <u>4.3</u>

TABLE 22 b The tonnage of Zanzibar's stated ivory exports to Hong Kong, compared with Hong Kong's official imports from Zanzibar for the 5 years 1959 - 1963, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the official Zanzibar exports.

Year	Tanzania Exports to Hong Kong	Hong Kong Imports from Tanzania	Difference as a proportion of Tanzania Exports
	Tons	Tons	%
1964	22.141	108.579	+ 390.4
65	28.798	117.279	+ 307.2
66	55.840	70.648	+ 26.5
67	49.199	64.153	+ 30.4
68	60.345	84.287	+ 39.7
69	98.552	100.962	+ 2.4
1970	82.365	57.403	- 30.3
71	59.207	66.929	+ 13.0
72	61.387	58.769	- 4.3
73	<u>25.262</u>	<u>31.529</u>	+ <u>24.8</u>
Totals	<u>543.096</u>	<u>760.538</u>	+ <u>40.0</u>

TABLE 22 c The tonnage of Tanzania's stated ivory exports to Hong Kong, compared with Hong Kong's official imports from Tanzania for the 10 years 1964 - 1973, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the official Tanzania exports.

Year	Tanganyika f.o.b. value for Hong Kong \$ per kg.	Hong Kong c.i.f. value of Tanganyika Imports \$ per kg.	Difference as a proportion of Tanganyika f.o.b. value %
1959	3.41	5.38	+ 57.8
1960	5.32	6.39	+ 20.1
61	3.89	4.72	+ 21.3
62	4.81	6.01	+ 24.9
63	4.67	5.86	+ 25.5

TABLE 23 a C.i.f. values of Hong Kong imports of Tanganyika's ivory compared with the f.o.b. values of Tanganyika's exports to Hong Kong, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

Year	Zanzibar f.o.b. value for Hong Kong \$ per kg	Hong Kong c.i.f. value of Zanzibar Imports \$ per kg	Difference as a proportion of Zanzibar f.o.b. value %
1959	3.75	5.46	+ 45.6
1960	4.07	6.19	+ 52.1
61	4.20	6.13	+ 46.0
62	3.60	5.85	+ 62.0

TABLE 23 b C.i.f. values of Hong Kong imports of Zanzibar's ivory compared with the f.o.b. value of Zanzibar's exports to Hong Kong, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

Year	Tanzania f.o.b. value for Hong Kong \$ per kg.	Hong Kong c.i.f. value of Tanzania Imports \$ per kg	Difference as a proportion of Tanzania f.o.b. value %
1964	5.46	6.29	+ 15.2
65	5.80	7.82	+ 34.8
66	5.39	7.34	+ 36.2
67	7.17	6.60	- 7.9
68	5.46	5.13	- 6.0
69	5.23	6.15	+ 17.6
1970	7.59	9.37	+ 23.5
71	8.71	10.74	+ 23.3
72	11.33	12.46	+ 10.0
73	28.82	32.17	+ 11.6

TABLE 23 c C.i.f. values of Hong Kong imports of Tanzania's ivory compared with the f.o.b. value of Tanzania's exports to Hong Kong, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

Year	Tanzania Exports to the U.K.	United Kingdom Imports from Tanzania	
	Tons	Tons	
1962	2.327	2.591	
63	1.043	4.318	
64	1.315	2.794	
65	0.663	0.203	
66	6.312	14.429	
67	2.702	9.399	
1970	1.800	1.677	
71	1.153	2.540	
72	0.805	-	
73	0.646	-	
Totals	18.766	37.951	+ 102%

TABLE 24 Tanzania's claimed exports to the United Kingdom, and the U.K.'s imports from Tanzania for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973.

Year	Tanzania f.o.b. value for the U.K.	United Kingdom c.i.f. value of Tanzania Imports	Difference as a proportion of Tanzania f.o.b.value
	\$ per kg	\$ per kg	%
1962	4.28	5.41	+ 26.4
63	4.85	5.19	+ 7.0
64	4.97	7.02	+ 42.3
65	6.60	6.90	+ 4.5
66	5.05	7.18	+ 42.2
67	7.63	6.56	- 14.0
1970	11.25	11.93	+ 6.0
71	7.75	6.89	- 11.1
72	-	-	-
73	-	-	-

TABLE 25 C.i.f. values of U.K.'s imports of Tanzania ivory compared with the f.o.b. values of Tanzania's exports to the U.K., with the difference expressed as a proportion of the f.o.b. value.

<u>Year</u>	Kenya & Uganda combined	Hong Kong Imports from
	exports to Hong Kong	Kenya & Uganda combined
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons</u>
1959	16.330	23.879
1960	27.716	28.268
61	42.141	37.819
62	12.882	55.903
63	11.069	17.493
64	28.765	44.985
65	22.715	25.729
66	43.829	44.384
67	53.602	95.093
68	60.432	90.562
69	30.541	67.914
1970	<u>51.102</u>	<u>82.223</u>
Totals	<u>401.124</u>	<u>614.252</u> diff. 213.148

TABLE 26 The combined ivory exports of Kenya and Uganda compared with Hong Kong's imports from Kenya and Uganda combined for the years 1959 - 1970.

<u>Year</u>	Kenya & Uganda combined	U.K. Imports from
	exports to the U.K.	Kenya & Uganda combined
	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons</u>
1962	2.395	1.118
63	5.580	2.134
64	10.047	4.928
65	6.375	5.538
66	8.444	11.736
67	3.692	7.418
1970	5.655	9.755
71	11.606	9.958
72	5.414	3.201
73	<u>3.412</u>	<u>3.658</u>
Totals	<u>62.720</u>	<u>59.439</u> diff. 3,281

TABLE 27 Kenya and Uganda's combined exports to the United Kingdom compared with the U.K.'s imports from Kenya and Uganda combined, for the years 1962 - 1967 and 1970 - 1973.

Year	E. A. Exports	Hong Kong Imports	Difference as
	to Hong Kong	from East Africa	a proportion of
	Tons	Tons	E. A. Exports
			%
1952	42.067	69.990	+ 66
3	76.919	101.007	+ 33
4	41.778	83.162	+ 99
5	77.708	79.841	+ 3
6	74.332	112.927	+ 52
7	87.189	90.340	+ 4
8	125.396	121.210	- 3
9	97.859	107.547	+ 10
1960	107.520	110.409	+ 3
1	124.425	105.186	- 15
2	108.320	150.215	+ 37
3	20.458	113.749	+ 456
4	50.906	153.565	+ 202
5	51.513	143.458	+ 178
6	99.669	115.032	+ 15
7	102.801	159.246	+ 55
8	120.777	174.849	+ 45
9	129.092	168.876	+ 31
1970	133.467	139.626	+ 5
1	102.675	151.545	+ 48
2	114.136	123.137	+ 9
3	184.325	368.561	+ 110

TABLE 28 East Africa's official exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's official imports from East Africa for the years 1952 - 1973, with the difference expressed as a proportion of the East African figures.

APPENDIX I

Herewith are a few illustrations of corruption, past and present. They were selected more for the ease with which I came by them, than for sensational content. It should be possible to make far more detailed records if there was purpose in doing so. My informants are identified by number.* Their names could be divulged if there was reason to do so, but at this stage it would serve no purpose.

* now see inside last page/cover.

1. Subject : Jack Bonham. Game Warden, Kenya Game Department, Coast Province c. 1946 - 1952. Shot numerous elephant on his own account without a licence. Evidence : the statements of two men who assisted him (1) (2), a fellow Game Warden who investigated this (3) but did not prosecute and a National Park Warden who accumulated the evidence circumstantially after Bonham retired.
2. Subject : David Allen. Game Warden, Kenya Game Department, Central and Coast Provinces, c. 1959 - 1960. Removed Government ivory from official registers, then claimed tusks as his own or friends and stated that they had shot them "on licence". Evidence : (1) My own eyes, (2) corroboration of a fellow Game Warden (5) and testimony of an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department - Kenya Police (6). Case never taken to court.
3. Subject : Michael De Souza. Senior Game Department Clerk. In 1960 sentenced to 3 years' probation for the theft of £30,000 worth of Government ivory. Leniency of sentence due to Magistrate's conviction that more senior men in the Game Department were involved (he referred to the Department as a "Gilbertian" outfit). De Souza had been given carte blanche by the Chief Game Warden W. Hale Esq., to sign permits to sell tusks. This was never checked by Hale, who retired and left Kenya before De Souza's case came to court.
4. Subject : D. Baker. Superintendent, Criminal Investigation Department, Kenya Police, Coast Province 1958. Destroyed the case file of evidence and statements concerning the pending prosecution of 2 Asians (M. & I. Hassan) and 2 Europeans (V. Toffani & G. Bell) for killing elephants without a licence. Evidence : Personal records as I was the investigating officer. Corroborated later by a pointed statement from M. Hassan that Baker was his "friend" and would "fix" me if I made further trouble.
5. Subject : Colin Lees and Game Warden Kiboko Station, Kenya Game Department (name not given). 1973. Lees, at the time an employee of the East African Railways Corporation, bought a pair of tusks out of 6 pairs offered to him by the Game Warden at Sh 75.00 per kilo. These he then took on an elephant licence saying he had shot the animal legally. He then acted as agent for the Game Warden seeking

other interested hunters who might wish to buy ivory. He approached my informant (7) with this proposition.

6. Subject : Confidential Internal Game Department Report written October 1973. Quotes :
- a) "The notorious 'collectors letters' did the Game Department's reputation much harm among a public which was not aware that they were not necessarily voluntarily issued by the Game Department." (In other words they were issued on instructions from "higher authority". I. P.)
 - b) "There appears to be a category of people who operate with immunity above the law."
 - c) "...the ivory register in headquarters does not give the impression of a document recording the possession and transfer of articles to the value of hundreds of thousands of pounds. Sources and destination of pieces of ivory taken on register are not necessarily given; whole pages of entries are crossed out without explanation. This register reveals the sharp increase in the practice of ivory transfer direct from H.Q. to individuals or dealers rather than via public auction at the ivory rooms. In the sixties over 90% of ivory went to the auctions in Mombasa; in 1970 80% went to the Ivory Rooms; in 1971 and 1972 combined this fell to 44%; in January to July 1973 only 23% of ivory recorded at H.Q. found its way to the Ivory Rooms."
 - d) "Leading personalities including both Assistant Ministers in our own Ministry were among those buying (ivory) from H.Q."

The officer (8) producing this report had his contract terminated within two weeks of handing it in.

7. Subject : Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. Nairobi 1973. An illicit ivory dealer (9) paid Mutinda Sh 60.00 per kilo to help ship 14 tons of ivory from Nairobi to Hong Kong in October 1973 during the "ban" on trading in ivory. Confirmed to me personally by (9).
8. Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. Nairobi 1973. Illicit ivory dealers (10) (11) moved 100 tons of ivory from Kenya to Hong Kong in 1973 having "paid off" Mutinda. Confirmed by oblique reference by both (10) and (11) and directly by their cousin and partner in business (12). The presence of the ivory in Hong Kong was physically confirmed by inspection (13).

9. Subject : Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. Nairobi 1973. Gave (10) and (11) permission to acquire 22, 000 colobus monkey skins from within Kenya where the species is protected. Confirmed by my personal observation.
10. Subject : Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. 1968 - 1972. Involved in large scale licensing of illegal zebra skins in collusion with officials of Tanzania Game Department. Documented in great detail by (14).
11. Subject : Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. 1974. Stated in interview with World Wildlife Fund representative (15) that Kenya only exported c.30 tons of ivory annually - an outright lie.
12. Subject : Chief Game Warden, Kenya : John Mutinda. 1973. Issued a Press statement, -
"... all dealings in ivory will be suspended indefinitely with effect from the first of September 1973" East African Standard, 31st August 1973.

See chapter on Kenya's ivory exports for confirmation that exports in fact continued openly.
13. Subject : Karanja Gathuru. Businessman. Nairobi 1973. Obtained sanction to break the law on importing ivory into East Africa and tried to buy it as far afield as Botswana. Written evidence in my own files.
14. Subject : Mr. Longwe. Malawian businessman based in Nairobi. Ex-official of the World Bank. 1973. Obtained sanction to break the law on importing ivory into East Africa : also sought ivory in Botswana and in the Sudan. In conversation with me confirmed that his authority came from "higher than the Game Department", but would not divulge the person responsible.
15. Businesswoman : Esther Mwikari Kariuki : wife of the Assistant Minister of Wildlife and Tourism, Kenya Government. 1973. Prosecuted for illegal possession of ivory. Fined £450. On Appeal Judge stated fine ridiculously low but could not increase sentence as Prosecution had made no request for this to be done. (See case 6 d.)

16. Subject : Businessman : Peter Mbindah. December 1973, Nairobi. Understood that I was buying ivory and asked me to take 5 tons from him. I asked whether it was legal. It was not, but Mbindah stated that his partner was the Police officer 2nd in command of the Nairobi District who had guaranteed all legal documents would be provided. Witness to this conversation (16).
17. Subject : Businessman : W. Harvey & 4 others. August 1973. Arrested in possession of 63 elephant tusks. On 4th September they were all released : the police prosecutor entered a plea of nolle prosequi on "instructions from the Attorney General's office". This was refuted a day later by the Attorney General's office. The police had themselves "arranged" the matter. Details presented in the East African Standard.
18. Subject : Businessmen Kamau Thiongo and Kanyaheho Gitau v. Republic of Kenya, for illegal possession of 32 tusks. State withdrew the case against Thiongo, the senior of the two with no reason given. Magistrate stated the procedure was dubious and that there were "big fish" behind the accused.
19. Subject : Housewife : Mrs. Diane Wambui. Arrested January 1973 in possession of 153 elephant tusks. Case withdrawn on instructions from the Attorney General's office. Evidence in the East African Standard.
20. Subject : Magistrate : Mr. Tank hearing a case against two men for the illegal possession of 26,500 colobus monkey skins, stated "... it looked as though there was no rule of law as far as trophies were concerned." (vide Game Department practices.)
21. Subject : 2 Arab traders : names not obtained. A lorry was found by Administration Police stuck in the mud at Witu, Coast Province, mid 1973. On searching they found it contained more than 300 tusks. The carriers were without any documentation. Some months later, the necessary documents "arrived from Somalia" and no prosecution followed. There was no record of the vehicle having passed through any Customs barrier between Kenya and Somalia and no Customs record of any ivory coming into Kenya that year : see Chapter 1. Information from (5).

22. Subject : Arab traders, names not given : seized with a cache of ivory of 130 tusks in the Boni forest - Lamu - by Game Warden, Lamu. No action taken (5).
23. Subject : Businessman Karanja Gathuru : August 1974. Arrested in possession of ivory in Garissa District. Produced a letter from Deputy Chief Game Warden Daniel Sindiyo which stated :
"I am instructed to renew your Dealer's Permit".
This is after the Government declared its monopoly on ivory trading. (5)
24. Ex Mau Mau General Kamiti c. 1964/65. On Jomo Kenyatta's personal instructions was given authority to sell ivory and leopard skins collected during the "freedom fight". Game Department opposed this sanction but ultimately agreed to sell the trophies on Kamiti's behalf. He was unable to produce more than a few small pieces of ivory and a few poor leopard skins. Despite this evidence that he was not in possession of trophies from his days in the forests, he was given further permission to sell £75,000 worth of ivory outside of Game Department supervision on Presidential orders. Informant (24).
25. Ex Mau Mau General Kamiti : September 1973, stated that President Kenyatta had promised certain former terrorists that ivory was to be "their fruit" (matunda yetu), and was indignant about the ban on trading. Informant (17).
26. Subject : Alleged former "Field Marshall" Muthoni - a Kikuyu woman dealing in ivory throughout 1972 and 1973 (and further back). This woman came out of the "forests" as one of the last Mau Mau to return to normal life. She was received with much publicity, but the whole affair seemed to have been fabricated. There was no mention of any such "Field Marshall" during the Mau Mau Emergency. However, President Kenyatta gave instructions that both she and her accomplice were to be given permits to sell the ivory that they had hidden during the "war". With this carte blanche, Muthoni was soon recovering ivory from areas hundreds of miles from the Aberdare Mountains. (5).

27. Subject : Field Marshall Muthoni : 1973. Arrived in the Deputy Chief Game Warden's office with a statement that she was to be allowed to buy Game Department Ivory "at a fair price". The officer (Mr. Michael Macharia) refused her permission, whereupon she put a telephone call through to State House and complained. Within minutes a call came back from the President himself in which Mr. Macharia was asked to explain himself. Not unsurprisingly, he was bereft of explanations. The Field Marshall got her ivory at give away prices. Informant (5).
28. Subject : United Africa Corporation : Major shareholder, Miss Margaret Kenyatta, the Mayor of Nairobi and daughter of Jomo Kenyatta. The United Africa Corporation exported more than 50 tons of ivory to Peking in 1972. This was stated by the Company manager in an interview with a newspaper reporter (18).
29. Subject : United Africa Corporation : Margaret Kenyatta's company as above. Statement made to me personally by the new manager - K. Pusey (Pissy) :
"all ivory the company exported in 1973 and 1974 was from the Game Department."
30. Subject : United Africa Corporation : Margaret Kenyatta's company as above. Exported ivory to Peking and Shanghai throughout the 1973/74 ban on trading. Evidence : personal observation of consignments in transit, acquisition of relevant airwaybills, witnessed by (19) and now in possession of (20).
31. Subject : Attorney General : Mr. Charles Njonjo. 1974. I approached illicit ivory dealer (9) and told him I was gathering a large consignment of illegal ivory. I would like to get "cover" for this from the Attorney General, could this be arranged. Within ten minutes he was talking to another Asian who claimed to be Njonjo's "arranger". It was confirmed that Njonjo could and would provide cover - when would I like an appointment with this go-between to arrange the details? At this point I terminated the contact by saying that I was not ready.

32. Subject : The President of Kenya : Jomo Kenyatta. July 1974.

With the onset of the new ban on ivory trading, several approaches for an explanation were made by legitimate hunters to the Minister for Tourism and Wildlife. During one, the illegal ivory trade was mentioned whereupon the exasperated Minister said words to this effect.

"What can I do about it when he (Mzee Kenyatta) has just instructed me to issue a permit to export 15 tons to Margaret Kenyatta and 5 tons to Mungai (Kenya's Foreign Minister) ?"

Informant (19) to whom the statement was made.

So far the cases have been confined to ivory or wildlife matters. However, samples from wider fields are :

33. Subject : The Experimental station at Naivasha, sponsored by Dutch

Government aid : Date unspecified. The farm has a number of cattle donated by the Dutch Government. One day the Provincial Agricultural Officer approached the Dutch station manager and stated that he had been instructed to remove the cattle from the farm. The manager refused permission to this. On the following day a lorry was sent by the Provincial Commissioner with an armed escort who forcibly removed the cattle. They were then taken to the Provincial Commissioner's farm at Nyeri. Informant (21) witnessed the incident.

34. Subject : Wheat Export : Vice President Daniel Arap Moi : 1972/73.

Wheat farmers in Kenya have to sell their produce to the Kenya Farmers Association for c. Sh 72.00 per bag. Recently the country has had to import wheat from abroad at over Sh 200.00 per bag. Moi has ignored the law and been selling his own wheat direct to Uganda at the international price. Informant (22) witnessed the loading of bags into Uganda-bound trains and verified its ownership and destination by examining the raling documents.

35. Subject : Lonrho/Express Transport Ltd. c. 1972 (date uncertain).

Express Transport Ltd. a major firm of hauliers bought out by Lonrho. In 1972 Express Transport's road licences came up for renewal. All licences were refused until Dr. Njeroge Mungai (Kenya's Foreign Minister) had received £10,000 into a London bank account. Informant (23) saw all relevant correspondence and received other information from the principals involved.

36. Subject : Ngina Kenyatta : c. 1972 (date uncertain). Bought the old Gailey & Roberts Building in Kimathi Street, Nairobi. Tenants with leases 5 years to run at the time of take-over were informed that irrespective of their legal right, they had to agree to rents being doubled. Thus one lessee's rent went from Sh 4, 000.00 per month to Sh 10, 000.00. The option for this man was pay or face closure of business and deportation (15).
37. Subject : Ngina Kenyatta : 1973/74. Together with various associates including Vice President Daniel arap Moi stole a valuable gem mine from two American prospectors : widely reported in the international Press.
38. Subject : Jomo Kenyatta : 1974 : Stated to own personally or in partnership, more than 2, 000, 000 acres of land in Kenya. (25) Financing for his own and his wife's land acquisition draws heavily on the Corporation's funds. These are provided to facilitate African entry into modern agriculture. Each time the Kenyattas draw on the Corporation's funds it causes radical re-scheduling and delays in its general plans. (25)
39. Subject : Ngina Kenyatta : 1973/74. Purchased 21 houses in London's Swiss Cottage residential area for \$600, 000 cash. There is virutally no way that she could have accumulated such large external funds except by contravening Kenya's currency regulations (26).

* Agricultural Development

APPENDIX II

As the conservation of elephant is subordinate to human affairs, I deliberately avoided comment on it in the main report. However, there are steps that could be taken to improve the current position, though they will require rather more intellectual honesty than has been shown by conservationists to date. Some of them are :-

1. Appreciation of the role ivory plays in human affairs as a currency.
2. Following on 1., recognising that little will be gained by continuing to make the possession and trading in ivory "illegal", except to force the trade underground.
3. As ivory is widely available throughout the continent, and as law enforcement officers are too few to prevent it being obtained, the logical course is to open the trade and endeavour to control it through manipulation of the price of ivory. This could be done by the international trade, or by some international concern acquiring a sufficiently large stock of ivory to be used to flood markets and dampen prices at times of high demand or rising values.
4. Recognising that all elephants extant cannot be protected, that most of their ranges outside permanent sanctuaries are being occupied by man, and that efforts to protect them everywhere will therefore be wasted effort in the long run.
5. Following on 4., anti-poaching effort should be concentrated on national parks alone. This would produce sufficient concentration of law-enforcement personnel to make their presence an effective deterrent to poaching.
6. Making conservation "aid" dependant on results that can be verified by the donors - not the receivers as at present.

1. Charo Kenga - Ex Game Scout.
2. Elui Nthengi - Ex poacher.
3. Eric Rungren - Ex Game Warden & Professional Hunter.
4. F.W. Woodley - National Park Warden.
5. Jack Barraah - Ex Game Warden & C.D.A. adviser to the Kenya Game Department.
6. R. Winterburn - Kenya Police - C.I.D.
7. L. Bull - Gunsmith.
8. Dr. P. Jarman - Ex Senior Research Officer - Kenya Game Department.
9. Vinod Mohindra - Merchant.
10. Chimu Gidoomal - Merchant.
11. Prem Gidoomal - Merchant.
12. Ram Gidoomal - Merchant.
13. John Ilsley - Businessman.
14. Eric Balson - Ex Tanzania Game Department.
15. Ellis Monks - World Wildlife Fund (Kenya).
16. Dr. Richard Bell - Zoologist.
17. John Aniere - Safari Operator.
18. Roy Perrit - Journalist.
19. Jack Block - Hotelier.
20. Karen Lerner - News feature producer, N.B.C., New York.
21. Dr. S. de Vries - Experimental Station, Naivasha.
22. P.J. Reynolds - Farmer.
23. A.L. Archer - Professional Hunter.
24. I.R. Grimwood - Ex Chief Game Warden, Kenya.
25. George Murphy - Agricultural Finance Corporation, Nairobi through J. Gore - Farmer.
26. Mrs. S. Spry.



P. O. Box 30678,

Nairobi.

CONFIDENTIAL

In July 1974 I was asked to prepare a report on the East African Ivory trade and its political implications. I agreed to do so on a professional basis. The sponsors requested that their names be kept secret.

The report was completed in October 1974. Its salient features were :

1. Current and past policy toward Ivory lacked appreciation of its role as a currency, availability and the situation of the majority of people who exploited it. Summarised the position is that irrespective of the needs and lusts of men, if elephants are born, in time they will die. In dying they leave freely available ivory. Potentially this is the largest source of tusks in Africa. It is unreal to expect people living in poverty and in proximity to elephant populations not to take advantage of such wealth. In the circumstances no law is likely to succeed in preventing its use. Natural elephant mortality therefore provides an irremovable basis for an ivory trade for as long as elephants exist. Any law making trade in ivory illegal merely drives the business underground. This intrinsic aspect of the Ivory trade has consistently been ignored.

Conservationist argument against free-trading is that while collection of ivory from natural mortality is acceptable or even desirable, it would provide impenetrable cover for illicit elephant hunting. This is true. However, an intransigent ban on trading does not remove either the availability or attraction of Ivory and if anything, increases the poverty of those who collect it in the first instance. While the conservationists' problem is clear, action taken does not seem suitable. More realistic laws are required and until they are enacted, an illegal ivory trade will exist regardless of Governments and ideologies.

2. On the basis of comparisons between Customs records of East African Ivory exports, and those of imports by the 'consuming' countries, it is apparent that a substantial illegal trade was taking place long before East African independence. From the records alone, it is difficult to conceive of this taking place without the connivance and participation of some senior British civil servants. Evidence involving former Game Wardens and Police officers in illicit ivory was presented.
3. Asian influence in the illicit trade was allied to their political fortunes in East Africa. The records suggest clearly that as soon as it became apparent that they were not an acceptable element in independent East Africa, Asians set about exporting capital. Ivory was a substantial vehicle for such transference. However in recent times Asian influence appears to have diminished and been replaced by African involvement.

4. Concurrent with the African take-over of Ivory trading the volume of Ivory exported has risen very sharply - over the 3 years 1971, '72 and '73, increases in volume over the preceding year were between 73% and 86% annually. This is based on the East African records which are shown to be grossly under-recorded (e.g. in 1973 Kenya's stated exports to Hong Kong were claimed as c. 146 tons, Hong Kong acknowledged imports of well over 200 tons). Convincing evidence of the minimal monetary losses to East Africa for 1973 indicate that \$19,000,000.00 were banked outside the 3 territories. Of the 3 countries, Kenya was by far the most important in the Ivory trade recently.
5. Evidence was presented that many influential Kenyans were involved in Ivory dealing. This included the President himself. The Chief Game Warden was obviously pivotal to all recorded Ivory exports.
6. It was pointed out that the same level of "corruption" that pertained to Ivory, also applied very widely in many walks of life in Kenya. In the circumstances it was considered pointless to single out Ivory in the hope that as a small facet the 'rackets' might be stopped.
7. It was pointed out that the internal and international potential of the material in the report was considerable and dangerous. It could be used in a variety of ways to rend Kenya's political and social fabric. In astute hands the material could be used to embarrass aid-giving Governments before their own electorates, if their disregard for obvious corruption in recipient countries could be demonstrated. The information could badly damage Kenya's future ability to benefit from international charity. Internally it could be used potently by the current Government's opponents.
8. It was concluded that if the report's sponsors wished to correct the Ivory trade, they had no option other than to involve themselves in Kenyan affairs to a degree hitherto un contemplated. This point was made starkly to get the point over. However it was NOT recommended the sponsors should so involve themselves.

Copies of the report were given to the British High Commission and the American Embassy, and they were asked to make comment. Both returned the report with the statement that it was too "hot".

The report was then debated among the sponsors. Unanimously it was agreed that it should be put to no destructive use. It was felt that if merely divulged to the world public, nothing would be gained except embarrassment. For all the corruption evident in it, it was accepted that the Kenya Government was maintaining an unparalleled level of civilisation in Africa. If the information in the report could be passed on to those in power in Kenya and thereby stimulate them to consider the consequences of current trends, no

better use could be made of it. The form in which the information should be presented and to whom were never decided. In the interim someone leaked the existence of the report, its contents, author and the name of one of the sponsors to the Government.

The Director of Intelligence, Special Branch, Kenya Police, made a demand for the report. He claimed direct Presidential instructions to obtain it immediately and guaranteed freedom from prosecution, deportation or any other unpleasantness for sponsors and author. Great urgency seemed apparent as requests included waking me at midnight.

The Presidential demand was debated by the sponsors. The report could bring severe retribution on all having had anything to do with its production. It was felt that it might easily produce a violent reaction from the President, assurances to the contrary notwithstanding. To offset any such happening, copies of the report were lodged in London with instructions that the information was to be released to the widest possible publicity in the event of any of the people connected with the report being troubled by the Kenyan authorities.

Having taken the foregoing precaution it was decided to give a copy of the report to President Kenyatta, subject to the condition that it remained confidential and that he would discuss it with the author and the one sponsor known - J. Block. The reasoning behind this decision was that if received constructively it could lead to action to reduce the considerable social tensions that are building up in Kenya, and which threaten its stability. If on the other hand it was merely shelved it would reveal a disregard for these tensions that would have considerable bearing on the motivation for current policies in all fields of Kenya's life. Either course would be of value to the sponsors.

During the frequent contacts that preceded and followed the handing over of the report (on 2nd February 1975) to the Director of Intelligence, he was warned that the international Press were aware that something was in the wind. If they sought the information given in Customs records, they would have much of the basic material contained in the report and would publish it without reference to anyone in Kenya. It was in their own interests to put the report to quick use to avoid destructive criticism. He made it abundantly clear that the President wished to avoid publicity at all costs and was certain that immediate action would follow his reading the report.

Naturally I have done my best to locate the leaker who informed the Government that the report existed. Sources inside the Kenya Police Special Branch state categorically that it derived from either the U.S. Embassy or the British High Commission. The weight of opinion favours the latter, though this admission might well be a fabrication. Several people knew of the preparation of the report, if not its content in detail, and have been spreading its existence around (e.g. John Eames has set at least two journalists from

international papers onto asking J. Block and myself for copies).

A further bulletin will be sent you in due course. In the interim you are asked to file this letter confidentially.

15th February, 1975


Ian Parker

DOCS RELATING

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